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JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES IN INDIANA: I1*
RALPi

F. FuCHSt

D. Prerequisites to Review Proceedings
Assuming that a given administrative determination is of a kind
which is subject to challenge in court on some justiciable ground and
that one or more types of review proceedings exist in which such a challenge could be offered, it is still necessary for a given party to show, as
a prerequisite to bringing one of these proceedings, that he occupies
a position entitling him to invoke it. To do so, he must have an interest
in the matter which (a) is of a kind entitled to protection in the particular proceeding sought to be invoked, and (b) is entitled to judicial
protection at the time, because available administrative remedies have
been exhausted.
As to the kind of interest entitled to protection, the courts start
with the proposition that judicial proceedings may not be brought to
vindicate interests that have not become legal rights residing in a party
or parties who bring an action. Thus, the ordinary interest of property
owners and the public in using a street is not a basis for a non-statutory
injunction suit challenging the action of municipal authorities in vacating the street; but the peculiar interest of an abutting owner affords a
basis for him to sue.1 72 Perhaps for a similar reason, or because of
statutory procedural provisions which cast the duty of going forward
with medical license revocation upon administrative authority, the individual whose complaint led to the cancellation of a medical license was
held not to be entitled to participate in an appeal to the Supreme Court
from a lower-court decision reversing the revocation. 173 The question
whether certain types of personal interests are deemed to rise to the
* Part I of this article appeared in the Fall Issue, p. 1, supra.

t Professor of Law, Indiana University.
172. City of Indianapolis v. Maag, 57 Ind. App. 493, 107 N.E. 529 (1915).
173. Board of Medical Registration v. Kaadt, 225 Ind. 625, 627, 76 N.E.2d 669
(1948).
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level of civil or property rights entitled to equitable protection, as distinguished from mere privileges which are said not to be so entitled, has
already been discussed. 1 74 Matters of a formal nature may enter into the
substance of the right for which protection is sought, as is the case where
the availability of a non-statutory action to recover money paid to the
state turns on whether the payment was made under economic coercion
and under protest. If it was, the action may be brought; if not, the money
17 5
is beyond redemption.
In this State political rights which an individual has in common
with other citizens may be vindicated in mandamus proceedings.17 6 In
the case which originally announced this principle, the relator had a
direct financial interest as a taxpayer in the performance of the duty
sought to be compelled, since the amount of his assessment turned upon
it; 7 7 but no such factor has been present as a basis for some of the later
decisions. 1 78 Thus the validity of a legislative apportionment 79 and of
a permanent registration law' 80 could both be challenged judicially at
the instance of voters affected. In the latter situation a declaratory
judgment action was held to lie, apparently in the sensible view that the
scope of this remedy should not be less than that of the traditional
remedies which it supplements, including mandamus. An injunction
suit, however, cannot be used for the same purpose, if only because
mandamus is available and more appropriate.' 8 ' In another declatory
174. See Part I, pp. 29-31 supra. See also Dep't of Financial Institutions v.
Johnson Chevrolet Co., 228 Ind. 397, 92 N.E2d 714 (1950). (A- Concern having the
intent to become a licensed seller of insurance, but not yet licensed, held lacking any
"property right or interest" that might entitle it to challenge the validity of a regulation
affecting licensed sellers).
175. Spring Valley Coal Co. v. State, 198 Ind. 620, 154 N.E. 380 (1926); State
v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 175 Ind. 59, 93 N.E. 213 (1910).

176. 2

GAVIT, INDIANA PLEADING AND PRACTICE

1793 (1942).

177. Hamilton, Auditor v. State ex rel. Bates, 3 Ind. 451 (1852).
178. The reason for the view which has been taken no doubt lies in the origin
of mandamus as a writ whereby the King as head of the state could call his subordinates to account through the ing's Bench. The restrictions upon the availability
of the remedy, which resulted from this theory and rendered official permission necessary to the maintenance of a mandamus proceeding upon the initiative of a private
party, have disappeared in this State; but a reminder of them resides in the requirement that the action of mandate be brought in the name of the State (see Part I, p.
18 supra) and in the public character of some of the interests that may be vindicated
in such an action. See Part I, note 92 supra. In some other jurisdictions-although
apparently a minority-a narrower view is taken. See Riesenfeld, Bauman and Maxwell,
Judicial Control of Administrative Action by Means of the Extraordinary Remedies in
Minnesota: I, 33 MINN. L. REv. 569, 578-79 (1949), and authorities cited.
179. Brooks v. State ex rel. Singer, 162 Ind. 568, 70 N.E. 90 (1904); Denney,
Clerk v. State ex rel. Basler, 144 Ind. 503, 42 N.E. 929 (1896).
180. Harrell v. Sullivan, 220 Ind. 108, 40 N.E.2d 115 (1942).
181. Greene v. Holmes, 201 Ind. 123, 166 N.E. 281 (1929). Here, in relation to
the protection of strictly public rights, injunction yields to mandamus. Compare Part
I, p. 20 supra.
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judgment action taxpayers were permitted to challenge the validity of a
statute permitting the State Board of Tax Commissioners to lower local
tax assessments, upon which the Board had acted with prospective financial benefit to the plaintiffs.:" 2 The taxpayer's injunction suit to challenge the validity of official action which may increase public expenditures is a recognized remedy.' 83
The right to bring a statutory review action depends, of course, upon
the statute. If its terms are not specific, their context and the practical
considerations involved must determine what interests come within them.
Thus, a user of public utility service is a party who may claim to be
"adversely affected" by an order of the public Service Commission setting rates, even when it reduces them, so as to qualify for bringing a
statutory review proceeding under a provision which entities persons so
affected to seek review.'8 4 A chamber of commerce, deeming itself
similarly affected and "feeling aggrieved" by an order or by a court
decree reversing an administrative order which permits a consolidation
of utility companies, may bring review proceedings or take an appeal to
a higher court in the matter. 8 5 The words "person aggrieved," employed
in a statute to designate who might take an administrative appeal from
the issuance of a building permit, were realistically held in one case not
to contemplate the owners of property near to that involved, since they
would ordinarily not know of the administrative action. Hence such
persons might bring an independent suit to enjoin construction under a
permit, without being open to the objection that their administrative
remedy by appeal had not been exhausted.' 8 6 It may be doubted, however, whether the same parties would have been preventd from taking
an administrative appeal, if the question had arisen because of their
effort to do so after gaining knowledge of the issuance of the permit.
They would certainly have been entitled to participate in an appeal taken
by someone else (e.g., the applicant if a permit had been denied in the
first instance), since the statute permitted remonstrances to be filed in
87
the appeal proceedings.
182. Zoercher v. Agler, 202 Ind. 214, 172 N.E. 907 (1930).
183. Bennett v. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533, 116 N.E. 921 (1917); Ellingham v. Dye,
178 Ind. 336, 412-414, 99 N.E. 1, 28-29 (1912); Board of Comm'rs of Clay County
v. Markel, 46 Ind. 96, 104-105 (1874) ; Harney v. Indianapolis, etc., R. R., 32 Ind. 244,
247-248 (1869).
184. Terre Haute Gas Corp. v. Johnson, 221 Ind. 499, 506, 45 N.E.2d 484, 486
(1942). See also State ex rel. Evansville City Coach Lines v. Rawlings, 229 Ind. 552,

560, 99 N.E. 597, 600 (1951).

185. it re Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co., 201 Ind. 667, 171 N.E. 65 (1930).
186. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Downing, 224 Ind. 457, 68 N.E.2d 789 (1946).
187. The statute governing the administrative appeal was not explicit on this
point, although it authorized "any party" to appear [Acts 1921, c. 225, § 4, p. 660, as
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In general, "person aggrieved" or similar words should be held to
embrace at least anyone with a demonstrable economic stake in the
outcome of the administrative proceeding sought to be reviewed. Such
persons include business competitors of an applicant for a permit to do
business, where the statute contemplates that public convenience and
necessity shall be a governing consideration ;188 consumers of a product
if its price or quality are to be affected by the administrative action;189
and possibly suppliers of ingredients of a product which may be excluded from use in the product if administrative action setting standards
for the product should be to a particular effect. 1 90 The present zoning
statutes recognize neighboring property owners as proper parties to
participate in administrative appeals and judicial review proceedings, in
opposition to permission to erect structures. 191 If this procedural liberality seems inconsistent with the narrower doctrine of earlier origin
respecting the right to challenge the closing of a street,192 the reason
may lie in the greater sensitivity of modern law to the need for protecting
interests of which people are actually conscious. There is, however, this
difference: The closing of a street involves a public decision as to a
matter predominantly public, whereas an action as to zoning involves to
a larger extent a balancing of conflicting private interests, through which
the public interest becomes involved.' 93
amended, IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-2304 (Burns 1933), superseded by id. § 53-780 (Burns
1951)]; but the following section, providing for judicial review, required notice to
persons who had filed remonstrances in the administrative appeal.
188. Kosciusko County REMC v. Public Service Comm'n, 225 Ind. 666, 77 N.E.2d
572 (1948). See National Coal Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 191 F.2d 462 (D.C.
Cir. 1951); Warehouse Distributing Corp. v. Dixon, 97 Ind. App. 475, 187 N.F_. 217
(1933). See I. Duffey & Sons Co. v. Kemmer, 110 Ind. App. 116, 37 N.E.2d 274 (1941).
189. See Associated Industries v. Ickeg, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), dismissed as
moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
190. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 120 F.2d 258 (7th Cir.
1941). Compare United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F.2d 116
(2d Cir. 1943).
191. The statute provides for notice of judicial review to the adverse party or
parties, who "shall be any property owner whom the record of the board of zoning
appeals shows to have appeared at the hearing before the board in opposition to the
petitioner." IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-784 (Burns 1951). The term "person aggrieved" has
been dropped from the statute in relation to administrative appeals, id. § 53-779, but
remains as a specification of who may seek judicial review, id. § 53-783. See Keeling v.
Board of Zoning Appeals, 117 Ind. App. 314, 69 N.E.2d 613 (1947).
192. City of Indianapolis v. Maag, 57 Ind. App. 493, 107 N.E. 529 (1915).
193. So, although a competing power company, as a "party aggrieved," might be
permitted to bring a statutory proceeding to challenge administrative action authorizing a new private installation, such a concern has been held not entitled to judicial
relief in a non-statutory proceeding against action which would result in setting up
new public competition for it. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 481-485
(1938). The Federal Communications Act withholds a right to judicial review of
radio license issuance at the instance of competitors unless electrical interference
is involved, but permits competitors to bring review proceedings in order to urge
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Under the Employment Security Act a special situation, somewhat
analogous to that in taxpayers' suits, has resulted in the holding, clearly
justified by the statute, 19 4 that the employer of a claimant of unemployment compensation, who has contributed through payroll taxes to the
benefit fund and whose future contributions may be affected by the
benefit payments chargeable to his account, 195 may seek review of a
96
decision favorable to the claimant..
The question of the nature of the interest entitling a private party
to seek judicial review of administrative action suggests the question of
the nature of the opposing interest and its representation in the review
proceeding. Ordinarily the answer is clear: The administrative agency
or the state is the proper defendant or respondent. In the Northwestern
Indiana Telephone Co. case,' 97 however, the Supreme Court came to the
odd conclusion that the Public Service Commission was not a necessary
party to a statutory "appeal" from one of its orders, where there had
been opposing private interests before the Commission. In Indianapolis
Water Co. v. Moynahan Properties Co., under a later statute providing
for review by injunction suit, the Court reversed a judgment granting
an injunction against the utility's collection of increased rates authorized
by the Commission, because the Commission had not been made a party
to the suit. The Court stated that "it was the legislative desire and intention that the Public Service Commission should be a party, representing the public in all actions where its rate orders are questioned as
unreasonable, unlawful, or void. . . ."19u The order in the earlier case
was not a rate order; but nothing turns on this difference. Unless an
agency becomes an administrative court before which other officials
prosecute claims, it should be given opportunity to fend for the public
interest involved in its actions, if a challenge is offered in review
proceedings.
The principle that administrative remedies must be exhausted before
resort can be had to a court arises under various circumstances: (1)
where available administrative review proceedings have not been invoked
at all or have been dropped; (2) where administrative proceedings have
resulted in an order but some supplementary step, such as a motion for
public interests which they possess the incentive to advance.

See DAvis, ADMINIS-

LAw 697-701 (1951); Federal Communications Comm'n. v. WJR, 337 U.S.
265 (1949).
194. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 52-15421, 52-1542k (Bums 1951).
195. Id. § 52-1535b.
196. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Co. v. Review Board, 117 Ind. App. 379, 393, 72 N.E.2d
662, 668 (1941).
txRivE

197. In re Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co., 201 Ind. 667, 675, 171 N.E. 65,

68 (1930).
198. 209 Ind. 453, 456; 198 N.E. 312, 314 (1935).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
reconsideration, has not been taken; and (3) where there have been
administrative review proceedings but some point, which it is sought to
make upon judicial review, has not been urged when it might have been.
The general principle that exhaustion of administrative remedies is
a prerequisite to judicial review has been recognized frequently in this
State. 19 9 The Supreme Court has recently emphasized its importance.
In the Evansville City Coach Lines case, two trade unions in behalf of
their members as users of local transportation services sought to enjoin
the enforcement of an order of the Public Service Commission, which
had been entered without notice or opportunity for a hearing, permitting
a local bus company to increase its fares. The Court made permanent
certain writs of prohibition and mandate which had been issued on a
temporary basis to prevent the trial court from giving further consideration to the suit. Its opinion pointed out that the Motor Vehicle
Act permitted the plaintiffs to complain to the Commission against the
fares at any time, to secure a hearing, and then to secure judicial review
of adverse action by the Commission, if the administrative proceeding
should fail to bring relief. 20 0 The administrative remedy so suggested
would not prevent the increased fares from being collected during its
pendency, and as a result the labor unions contended that due process
of law would be violated if, without notice and opportunity for hearing,
either before the agency or in court, the users of transportation services
would become subject to the increased charges. As has been pointed
out, 20 1 there are circumstances in which a threatened injury to private

interest through administrative action may be prevented by resort to
non-statutory judicial remedies in advance of the time when statutory
relief can be obtained; and it is true that at times the administrative
process itself may be superseded by this means. Where confiscation of
a utility's property is threatened, for example, by low rates which the
regulatory agency continues to enforce, immediate judicial intervention
can be had.102 The Court declined over vigorous dissent to regard the
199. E.g., Wilmont v. City of South Bend, 221 Ind. 538, 48 N.E.2d 649 (1943)
(discharged municipal employee); Culbertson v. Board of Comm'rs, 208 Ind. 22, 194
N.E. 638 (1935) (recovery of taxes).
200. State ex rel. Evansville City Coach Lines v. Rawlings, 229 Ind. 552, 99
N.E.2d 597 (1951). See note 184 supra.
201. See Part I, pp. 11-12 supra.
202. See Note, Irreparable Injury in Constitutional Cases, 46 YALE L.J. 255, 257
(1936) ; Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926); Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908). No similar case appears to have been reported in this state. Effect
has recently been given in statutory review proceedings in this state to the view that
confiscation may be prevented by the use of equitable powers. State ex rel. Public Service
Comm'n v. Marion Circuit Court, 100 N.E.2d 888 (Ind. 1951), 103 N.E.2d 214 (Ind.
1952); Public Service Comm'n v. Indianapolis Railways, 225 Ind. 30, 72 N.E.2d 434
(1947), 225 Ind. 656, 76 N.E.2d 841 (1948).
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threat to rate-payers as a ground for similar intervention. Its conclusion in this regard is predicated upon the statement that the Public
Service Commission has "the exclusive power of regulating and fixing
fares"; but behind its action is the view, which is supported by the
authorities generally, that the protection of the consumer interest lies
peculiarly in the administrative province, is of a different nature from
a utility's property interest, and does not call for even occasional shortcircuiting of the administrative process.
Because of the statute, which has been noted, 20 3 preserving preexisting judicial remedies under the school laws despite the availability
of statutory administrative appeals from township trustees to the county
superintendents,2 04 the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been held not to apply with reference to actions of trustees which
it is sought to challenge. Thus a school town and several taxpayers were
held entitled to bring an action of mandate to control a trustee's action
in terminating a joint school arrangement and refusing to furnish certain
transportation, without previous resort to the county superintendent.2 0 5
The Court drew a distinction between matters of "purely an administrative character," which may require resort to administrative appeals,
and matters involving "a clear legal right to the relief sought and a clear
legal duty on the part of the defendants to perform the thing demanded,"
which may be brought directly to court.2 0 6 This distinction really relates, however, to the availability of mandamus which, as has been
noted,20 7 does not lie to control administrative discretion, and to the
possibility of judicial relief at any stage, rather than to the question
20 8
whether administrative remedies take precedence over judicial ones.
The point of the case is that mandamus is appropriate or not, according
to the nature of the action sought to be challenged; and its availability
is not affected by the statute providing for administrative appeals in
township school affairs. The Court held subsequently, without qualification, that the party aggrieved by a irustee's action under the school laws
"has the option of the procedure for the determination of his grievance
2 09
°
before the school authorities, or he may maintain an action in court.
203. See Part I, p. 30 supra. The provision is now IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-704
(Bums 1933).
204. The statutory provision for such appeals is contained in IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 28-2405 (Burns 1933).
205. Jackson School Twp. v. State ex rel. Garrison, 204 Ind. 251, 183 N.E. 657
(1932).
206. Id. at 267, 183 N.E. at 663.
207. See Part I, p. 17 supra.
208. See Wilkins v. Newkirk, Trustee, 85 Ind. App. 663, 670, 155 N.E. 516, 519
(1927).
209. Brumfield, Trustee v. State ex rel. Wallace, 206 Ind. 647, 190 N.E. 863, 865
(1934).
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This decision was aided by the fact that the statute preserving judicial
remedies was enacted later than the one providing for administrative
appeals. As construed, this enactment invades seriously the principle
that administrative action should run its course before courts intervene.
The results include what appears to be a considerable body of litigation
and, perhaps, a weakened power of control by the county superintendent
over township trustees in school matters; but the fault, if there be one,
lies with the legislature.

210

The use of administrative rather than judicial proceedings is sometimes required by two other doctrines closely related to the principle that
administrative remedies must be exhausted before resort to court can be
had. Neither of these has been invoked explicitly in this State, but their
substance has emerged. One of these requires that the question sought
to be presented be "ripe" for review. It is not "ripe" if additional administrative steps are required before the administrative action becomes
final.2 1 1 In Stone v. Fritts, the plaintiff, a public school teacher, sought
an injunction against the threatened revocation of his teacher's license
by the defendant county superintendent, who had instituted threatened
revocation proceedings before himself. If the decision of the defendant
turned out to be adverse to the plaintiff, a statutory appeal to the state
superintendent was available. In holding that the suit would not lie,
the Court referred to the doctrine of exhaustion and also to the proposition that "[jfudicial officers, however wise, should not hastily usurp
the prerogatives and functions" of school officials "and seek to substitute their own opinions and judgments for those of men held accountable for results in educational affairs." "Tribunals established by law,"
212
the Court said, "may not infringe upon the jurisdiction of each other."
The other doctrine closely related to that of exhaustion of administrative remedies is that of "primary jurisdiction," which calls upon a
court to decline to entertain a suit which is filed, not by way of invoking
judicial review of administrative action, but independently of any administrative proceeding, where the matter involved is subject to administrative determination. 213 A contention that suit would not lie, based on
2 14
this ground, was rejected in Warehouse Distributing Corp. v. Dixon.
210. It is the more difficult under the statute for the courts to apply the principle
of exhaustion to matters arising in school affairs, because of a cause in the appeal
statute giving finality to the county superintendent's decision when an appeal has been
taken to him. Although this clause is subject to exceptions (see Part I, p. 30 supra),
it would cut deeply into the continued availability of judicial remedies which the later
statute seeks to secure, were the use of the earlier one not optional.
211. See DAvis, ADMINISTRATiVE LAW 652-663 (1951).
212. Stone v. Fritts, 169 Ind. 361, 369, 82 N.E. 792, 795 (1907).
213. See DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvW LAW 664-673 (1951).
214. 97 Ind. App. 475, 187 N.E. 217 (1933).
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There the plaintiff, a trucker possessing a certificate of convenience and
necessity from the Public Service Commission, was successful in sustaining an injunction by the lower court against the continuance of a
rival trucking operation which had not been authorized by the Commission. In holding that the controversy did not have to be brought
before the Commission, the Court recognized that that body has exclusive jurisdiction of matters which belong to it under the statute. Here,
however, the statute had been violated by the defendant in disregard of
the Commission, which could only have gone to court to vindicate its
authority if it instead of the court had been appealed to.2

15

The decision

is sensible, as is the Court's acceptance of the doctrine that matters requiring administrative determination cannot be carried off to court in
independent actions.
Where an administrative remedy has been employed, but some supplementary step such as a motion for reconsideration has not been taken,
the question of possible non-exhaustion of administrative remedies takes
on a different aspect. The only issue is whether an effort must be made
to give the agency a second opportunity to deal with the Matters involved
in the proceeding. Generally speaking, the answer is No. 216 The Federal

Administrative Procedure Act now so provides, except as otherwise expressly required by statute or by agency rule which also renders the administrative action inoperative pending the disposition of the request
for reconsideration.

2

17

In Indiana under the Railroad Commission Act prior to its amendment in 1913, judicial review was held to be inappropriate at the instance
of a party who had not attempted to secure a rehearing, perhaps because
of the statute's specific inclusion of authority for the Railroad Commission to grant rehearing. "[W]e perceive no good reason," said the
Supreme Court, "why the courts should be appealed to, in the first instance, to grant the relief that is within the power of the commission to
give.

'2 1

The words "in the first instance" suggest, as do the facts stated

in the opinion, however, that the holding resulted from the circumstance
that one of the contentions sought to be advanced on review in opposition
to the Commission's order had not been urged in the administrative pro215. Administrative agencies seldom possess independent powers of enforcement.
When resistance to their orders is encountered, either a judicial contempt proceeding, a
suit for injunction, or a prosecution is necessary to compel compliance. Which of these
means of enforcement is available depends ordinarily upon the governing statute.
LAW,
216. ]Levers v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 219 (1945); DAvis, ADMINimSTRAr
636-638 (1951).
217. 60 STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1946).
218. Chicago, I. & L. R. R. v. Railroad Comm'n, 175 Ind. 630, 638, 95 N.E. 364,
367 (1911).
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ceeding. If so, the decision is of course explicable on this ground. As
amended in 1913, the Railroad Commission Act requires a rehearing
as a condition of judicial review. 210 The Public Service Commission Act
does not contain a similar requirement, nor is there mention in it of reconsideration or rehearing of non-railroad cases, to which the Act applies.
It has been held, consequently, in accordance with the general view
elsewhere, that judicial review may be had without attempted resort to any
such procedure. 220 It was also held that a party wishing to obtain modification of a Commission order upon review, as distinguished from having
it set aside altogether, need not have sought its modification by the Commission because of the latter's continuing power to reopen questions
which have been before it. 2 21 The same view as to this point prevails
222
under the Railroad Commission Act.

The Supreme Court has indicated in a statement, not necessary to
its decision of the particular case, that an agency has no power to accord
rehearing procedure in the absence of statutory authority for it.2 2 3 This

view is of doubtful validity as a general proposition, at least as to
situations where some practical reason exists for not requiring that the
agency be bound by its first action; but it is reinforced under the adjudication act by a provision that a party aggrieved by an administrative
order subject to the act may within 15 days file a petition with the agency
for the right to introduce newly discovered evidence. 224 By inference,
the authority to reopen a proceeding for other reasons is probably excluded, especially in view of the act's prior provision that "[e] very order
or determination . . . shall be in full force and effect after it is duly

entered and spread of record in the permanent records of the agency,
provided, however, that the same may be reviewed as hereaftr provided. '22 5 The Act does provide that within the fifteen-day period during
which judicial review may be sought, "every agency shall have authority
219. IND. ANN. STAT. § 55-112 (Burns 1951).
220. Greensburg Water Co. v. Lewis, 189 Ind. 439, 128 N.E. 103 (1920).
221. Ibid. The Commission's continuing power involves the institution of new
proceedings rather than the revival of former ones by motions or petitions for
amendatory relief. Id. at 444, 128 N. E. at 104. For an instance of statutory power to
reopen and review a prior order which was subject to judicial review when made, see
Peabody Coal Co. v. Lambermont, 220 Ind. 525, 44 N.E.2d 827 (1942).
222. New York Central R. R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 191 Ind. 627, 632,
134 N.E. 282, 283 (1922). The contrary had been held under the unamended Railroad
Commission Act. Northern Ind., etc., Cable Co. v. People's Mutual Telephone Co.,
187 Ind. 486, 495-496, 119 N.E. 212, 214-215 (1918).
223. State Board of Tax Comm'rs v. Belt R.R., etc., Co., 191 Ind. 282, 130 N.E.

641 (1921).
224. IN . ANN. STAT. § 63-3015 (Burns 1951).
225. Id. § 63-3013.
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to modify any order or determination," thereby starting a new fifteen-day
period.22 6 This provision, however, seems intended solely for the purpose
of permitting the agency upon its own motion to strengthen its action if
inadequacies are discovered. There is no provision for the suspension of
the fifteen-day period within which judicial review must be sought,
pending agency action upon a request for modification.
In Park Improvement Co. v. Review Board, the failure to raise a
point in an administrative proceeding was held to be ground for judicial
refusal to entertain it upon review. 2 27 The decision was based on reasoning with relation to judicial appeals, as to a contention which is made for
the first time in the appellate court. This reasoning led to the conclusion that the contention had been waived by failure to make it in the
lower court; but the result might equally well have been grounded upon
want of resort to an available administrative remedy. 228 It should be
noted, nevertheless, that in some types of administrative proceedings, in
which the persons involved are inexperienced and perhaps without counsel, it would defeat the purpose of administration to insist upon a
procedural formalism that deprives a party of the right to make a
meritorious contention. If a substantial contention that was not made
before the agency under these circumstances, even when it might have
been, should be advanced upon judicial review, it ought to be entertained
and lead either to a remanding of the proceedings if the matter calls
for further administrative consideration or to a decision by the court
upon the point presented if it raises an issue of law which the court is
competent to determine.22 9
226. Id. § 63-3026.
227. 109 Ind. App. 538, 36 N.E.2d 984 (1941).

Slaubough v. Vore, 110 N.E.2d
299 (Ind. App. 1953), is illustrative of many cases that hold to the same effect with
reference to evidentiary points which are argued for the first time before a reviewing

court.
228. A leading case is National Labor Relations Board v. Cheney California
Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385 (1946). There the refusal of the Court to permit judicial
consideration of a point not raised before the agency rested upon a specific provision
of the Nation Labor Relations Act, such as many federal statutes contain, which
directed the courts not to consider any "objection that has not been urged before the
Board ... unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused
because of extraordinary circumstances." It probably did not require this provision,
however, to convince the Court that "Congress desired that all controversies of fact,
and the allowable inferences from the facts, be threshed out, certainly in the first

instance, before the Board. That is what the Board is for." id. at 389. See
LAw'615n. (1951).

DAvIs,

ADMINISTRATiVE

229. The federal courts have recently recognized on numerous occasions in
deportation and selective service cases, particularly if persons having difficulty with the
English language are involved, that administrative procedural requirements which interfere with presentation of the merits should not be insisted upon. See, e.g., Moser v.
United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951). As to the propriety of judicial decision in the first
instance of questions of law that fall also within the competence of administrative
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A special situation is presented under the Workmen's Compensation
Act. The statute makes provision for hearing and decisions which in the
first instance may be either by the full Industrial Board or by any of its
members. If less than all the members act, an application for review by
the full Board may be made within seven days. The Board must then
either review the evidence or rehear the parties. In either event, it reconsiders the entire case. If review by the full Board is not sought within
the prescribed period, the previous award becomes final and may not be
reviewed at all. 230 Accordingly, resort to the administrative remedy of
review by the full Board is a condition of judicial review. 2 3 1 When administrative review is invoked, the prior award is immediately rendered
inoperative as to all parties23 2 and any contentions of a party not then
made before the full Board, whether previously urged or not, are foreclosed upon judicial review.2 33 The reasoning is that the full Board must
have an opportunity to pass on all points before they are taken to a
court. 234 Although the procedural law thus evolved is a bit technical
and might entrap a claimant unrepresented by counsel, the fact is that
counsel are usually employed in compensation cases,2 3 5 and the litigious
nature of the proceedings in this respect seems not to present a particularly serious problem.
E. Requirements as to Agency Procedure
As has been indicated, the authority of the courts upon judicial
review of agency action extends to determining the legality of agency
procedures. If the procedure that has been followed in a particular instance has been illegal to the prejudice of a party invoking review, the
resulting action may be set aside, enjoined, or made the basis of other
appropriate relief.2 36 The Supreme and Appellate Courts, however, while
agencies, when questions of fact or discretion might not be touched, see Great Northern
Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
230. IND. ANN. STAT. §§40-1510, 40-1511, 40-1512 (Burns 1951).
231. Eades v. Lucas, 107 Ind. App. 144, 23 N.E.2d 273 (1939) ; Galvin v. Brown,
71 Ind. App. 30, 121 N. E. 447 (1919); SMALL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW OF
INDIANA

381 (1950).

232. Russell v. Johnson, 220 Ind. 649, 46 N.E.2d 219 (1943) ; Eades v. Lucas, 107
Ind. App. 144, 23 N.E.2d 273 (.1939).
233. Rhoden v. Smith & Decker Electric Co., 107 Ind. App. 152, 23 N.E.2d 306
(1939), followed in Hays v. Joseph E. Seagram & Co., 222 Ind. 130, 52 N.E.2d 356
(1944), and Deszancsity v. Oliver Corp., 118 Ind. App. 504, 81 N.E.2d 703 (1948).
See also Brooks v. International Furniture Co., 122 lnd. App. 300, 101 N.E.2d 197,
103 N.E.2d 220 (1952).
234. Rhoden v. Smith & Decker Electric Co., 107 Ind. App. 152, 23 N.E.2d 306

(1939).
235. SMALL, op. cit. supra note 231, at 378.
236. State Board of Medical Registration v. Scherer, 221 Ind. 92, 46 N.E.2d 602
(1943). As to the matters dealt with generally upon judicial review see Part I, p. 5,
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asserting their authority to enforce constitutional and statutory requirements as to administrative procedure, have recognized that the legislature may confer discretion upon administrative agencies to determine
their procedure within broad limits. When discretion of this sort has
237
been exercised, the resulting procedural requirements become binding.
With respect to the Public Service Commission the Supreme Court has
said, "the manner in which a question over which it has jurisdiction may
be presented to it, as also the method by which it may be advised to
correct action, is left almost entirely to the Commission." 28 8 , The Railroad Commission Act provides that "[tihe commission may adopt and
enforce such rules, regulations and modes of procedure as it may deem
proper to hear and determine complaints and for the conduct of all investigations held by it. .... ,239 The authority so conferred was held to
include the power to require an advance petition to the Commission for
leave to suspend a train, in connection with the power to regulate the railroads' service. 240 "If the commission lacked authority to make such rules
under the law," said the Court, "there would be a condition existing that
might become intolerable. '

241

The procedural rule-making authority of

the Industrial Board has been construed with similar breadth to embrace a
regulation governing the 'Method of obtaining from the Board those portions of the record in a case before the Board which it is desired to use in
prosecuting a judicial review proceeding.2 42 The power to prescribe procedures cannot be used, however, to impose an arbitrary requirement that
a claimant of unemployment compensation appear at the hearing upon his
request for an administrative review of the denial of compensation by a
referee, where sufficient reason for his non-appearance is given in correspondence.2 43 Similarly, the Public Service Commission's control over its
procedures cannot be used to deny to a utility that consideration of its
24
application for a rate increase to which the statute entitles it. 4

supra; p. 324 infra. As to the requirement of prejudice from procedural error, see

I. Duffey & Sons Co. v. Kemmer, 110 Ind. App. 116, 37 N.E.2d 274 (1941).
237. Coleman v. City of Gary, 220 Ind. 446, 44 N.E.2d 101 (1942). This discretion
is analogous to that which is exercised in substantive matters, Part I, pp. 2-3 supra,
and is supported by some of the same considerations involving the specialized competence
of the agencies.

238. It re Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co., 201 Ind. 667, 675, 171 N.E. 65,
68 (1930).
239. IxD. AwN. STAT. § 55-101(e) (Burns 1951).
240. Illinois Central R.R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 225 Ind. 643, 75 N.E.2d
900 (1947).
241. Id. at 647, 75 N.E.2d at 902.
242. Russell v. Johnson, 220 Ind. 649, 46 N.E.2d 219 (1943).
243. Poulsen v. Review Board, 122 Ind. App. 484, 106 N.E.2d 245 (1952); See
Part I, p. 9 supra.
244. Public Service Comm'n v. Indianapolis Railways, 225 Ind. 30, 72 N.E.2d
434 (1947).
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Basic to the effective exercise of many administrative functions is
the power to obtain information upon which agencies may decide whether
to proceed and what their determination shall be. 245 Procedural problems arise when compulsion is among the means which may be employed
to secure needed information. Three principal means of compelling disclosure could be used: (1) inspection or demand for information by
administrative officers, backed by judicial sanctions for contumacious
refusal; (2) similar inspection or demand, enforceable by administrative
commitment for contempt upon refusal; and (3) application by administrative officers for court orders commanding disclosure, backed by judicial power to sentence for contempt. Of these means, the second has
been declared unconstitutional in this State. 246 The first method has been
sustained 24 7 and presents no important procedural problems. The third
method has become the usual one where examination of books or papers
is sought and where oral testimony is required. When this method is
employed, important questions as to the occasions for its use and as to
the permissible scope of the demand for information may arise, as they
have under federal statutes ;248 but in Indiana the reported cases are few.
The entire history of the personal property tax in this state might
have been different if the Supreme Court had received support for the
position it took in 1895 on the question whether information as to
possible tax evasion might be compelled in advance of proceedings
against a specific taxpayer. In Satterwhite v. State,2 49 the Court affirmed
an order of the circuit court in a mandamus action, directing the officer
of a bank to permit a county board of equalization to inspect the bank's
books and to answer questions with respect to property shown on the
books, which depositors might have omitted from their returns as taxpayers. The board did not allege that it had reason to believe particular
taxpayers had omitted to declare property; its inquiry was exploratory.
Over the dissent of Chief Justice McCabe, who contended that the governing statutes authorized compulsion to secure disclosure and testimony
only when specific taxpayers were involved and had been notified, the
Court held that the statute did authorize the inquiry and the use of
compulsory process. It extended this holding to cover the authority of
245. State v. Wood, 110 Ind. 82, 10 N.E. 639 (1886).
246. Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 31 N.E. 190 (1891).
247. Albert v. Milk Control Board, 210 Ind. 283, 200 N.E. 688 (1936); Shuman
v. City of Fort Wayne, 127 Ind. 109, 26 N.E. 560 (1890). These cases sustain statutes
under which the failure to permit access to information in the possession of regulated
parties was punishable.
248. The problems and the law involved are analyzed in the opinion of the Court
in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
249. 142 Ind. 1, 40 N.E. 654 (1895).

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 307
assessors under analogous statutes in two subsequent cases. 250 Later,
however, in Applegate v. State ex rel. Bowling,251 involving a county
assessor's inquiry, the Court held that the assessor should at least be
required to name the taxpayers whom he believed to have omitted property from their returns. In the interim the legislature amended the statutes to authorize a circuit court specifically to issue a writ requiring the
production of records bearing upon the alleged omission of property from
a tax return, but restricted this authority to situations where an affidavit
had been filed with the court by a township or county assessor or member of a board, "setting forth his belief that certain property, to be named
in the affidavit, has been unlawfully omitted from a certain specified tax
return of a designated person, firm or corporation . . . and that some
other person, firm or corporation, to be named in the affidavit, has in his
or its possession certain specified books or papers containing evidence
tending to show such unlawful omission of taxable property." The
statute goes on to provide that "[n]o inspection of the books or papers
of any person, firm or corporation by any tax officer shall be permitted
or required except as specified . . . and all laws or parts of laws in
conflict herewith are hereby repealed. ' 2 52 This statute, substantially un253
changed, has been reenacted and is now in effect.
Thus a specific statutory procedure for compelling disclosure has
been provided, instead of the procedure by mandamus previously employed. The statute was applied and sustained not long after its enactment.2 5 4 Under its provisions no previous demand need be made upon
the party from whom information is desired. It could be argued that, because no controversy has arisen when the matter reaches a court, no judicial determination can be had. 25 5 The Court did not take cognizance of
of this point, contenting itself with the observation that "the statute contemplates no previous notice to the person or corporation supposed to
2 56
have" the desired evidence in its possession.
Other statutes, such as the Employment Security Act, follow the federal method of compulsion by providing for judicial orders to enforce
administrative subpoenas if disobedience is encountered.2 57 Still others,
250. Cooperative Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. State ex rel. Daniels, 156 Ind. 463, 60
N.E. 146 (1901) ; State ex rel. Morgan v. Real Estate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 151 Ind. 502,
51 N.E. 1061 (1898).
251. 158 Ind. 119, 63 N.E. 16 (1902).
252. Ind. Laws 1901, c.LXXI, p. 109.
253. IND. ANN. STAr. § 64-1026 (Burns 1951).
254. Washington National Bank v. Daily, 166 Ind. 631, 77 N.E. 53 (1906).
255. See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894), in which,
as is the universal practice under federal statutes of this sort, demand and refusal
preceded the resort to court.
256. Washington National Bank v. Daily, 166 Ind. 631, 638, 77 N.E. 53, 55 (1906).
257. IND. ANN.STAT. §§ 52-1542f, 52-1542g (Burns 1951).
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like the Public Service Commission and Railroad Commission Acts,
provide penalties for disobedience to administrative subpoenas. 258 The
adjudication act, which contains no procedural prescriptions for investigations, provides simply that "[w]henever the law applicable to the
particular agency authorizes such agency to make investigations or inspections it may make the same as so authorized with or without notice."'2 59 By investigations without notice the act doubtless refers to
general inquiries in advance of actual adjudicative proceedings.
Indiana decisions contain relatively little with regard to procedural
requirements surrounding the formulation and issuance of general regulations by administrative agencies. The reason lies in the traditional absence of any such requirements, stemming from administrative convenience and the freedom of the legislature itself to frame its enactments
without extending opportunities for appearances or other procedural
courtesies to affected parties. 260 Under the act of 1945 governing rulemaking, however, published notice and opportunity for hearings are
mandatory in advance of the issuance of all regulations other than those
relating to internal agency policy, organization, or procedure. Additional
procedures, such as conferences with interested parties and written submissions by them, may be employed. 2 61 Before a regulation may issue it
must be approved by the Attorney General for legality and by the Governor. It becomes effective upon filing with the Secretary of State, who
is required to publish an official compilation of the regulations of state
agencies currently in effect. 26 2 The law appears to be gravely defective

because of the absence of any exception for emergency regulations, such
as might be necessary to meet an acute health situation, similar to the
exception which the adjudication act contains for temporary emergency
2 68

orders.

The hearing in connection with rule-making, pursuant to the Act
of 1945, may be an informal legislative variety, since the requirement is
simply "an adequate opportunity to participate in the formulation of the
proposed rule or rules through the presentation of facts or argument or
258. Id. §§ 54-404, 55-116. The Public Service Commission Act provides also for
enforcement orders from the courts. rd. § 54-416.
259. Id. § 63-3005.

260. The Final Report of the United States Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure contains an account of the development of administrative
rule-making and of rule-making procedure in the federal system. REP. AT-r'y GEN. Comm.
AD. PROC. C.

9 (1941).

See also Fuchs, Constitutional Implications of the Opp Cotton

Mills Case with Respect to Procedure and Judicial Reiew in Administrative RuleMaking, 27 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1941), where account is taken of rule-making under state
authority.

261. IND.

ANN. STAT.

262. Id. § 60-1505.

263. Id. §63-3005.

§ 60-1504 (Burns 1951).
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the submission of written [data] or views.

'26 4

In its historical context,

the act clearly was not intended to require that the "presentation of
facts," for which opportunity must be given, be of the variety which
occurs in court. Rules of evidence, cross-examination, and other incidents of an adversary proceeding-even the swearing of persons appearing-need not have a place in what goes on.2 " The procedural requirements imposed by the act must be followed, however, and a published
regulation which was not arrived at in the prescribed manner is invalid. 216

Neither may general regulations binding upon administrative

authorities be established informally, without observance of the pro-

2 67
visions of the act.

Administrative adjudication is ordinarily set off from rule-making
by the fact that it involves a process directed to disposing of the interests
of particular persons, rather than the formulation of general regulations.2608 Among the requisites to valid adjudication is a tribunal free
from prejudice as to the interests upon which it must pass. 26 9 Strongly-

held views as to the merits of a case do not disqualify a tribunal so
long as its members preserve an attitude of acting on the basis of evidence; but personal spleen indicative of a determination to reach a given
result is an invalidating factor. Fraud, of course, also invalidates a
proceeding and its outcome.2 70 The matter of prejudice, apart from
fraud, has arisen most often in this State in cases involving removals
from office.
The fact that the official who must decide a removal case is also
the principal witness against the person involved in the proceeding does
2 1
not invalidate the hearing or the resulting order of removalY.
7
It has
264. See note 259 supra.
265. See note 258 supra; Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52

HARV. L. Rm. 259 (1938).
266.

State ex rel. Sights v. Edwards, 228 Ind. 13, 28-29, 88 N.E.2d 763, 89 N.E.2d

443 (1949).
267. State ex rel. Blair v. Gettinger, 230 Ind. 588, 105 N.E.2d 161 (1952).
268. Under the Indiana adjudication act it means "the administrative investigation,
hearing and determination by any agency of issues or cases applicable to particular
persons ... ." IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-3002 (Burns 1951).
269. Prejudice in the invalidating sense must be distinguished from "bias" as to
policy which stems from commitment to achieving the legislative purpose which an agency
and its officials are there to serve. See DAvis, ADMAIN.ISTRATIVE LAw c. 9 (1951).
270. Burridge v. Mishawaka, 75 N.E.2d 560 (Ind. App. 1947); See Part I, note
52 suepra.
271. Stiver, Trustee v. State ex tel. Kent, 211 Ind. 380, 1 N.E.2d 1006 (1936).
The reasoning clearly is that the dual capacity in which the -official functions is made
necessary by law and cannot in itself be a ground of invalidity. "It was the duty of
the trial court, while examining the evidence introduced in the hearing before fhe
trustee, not to consider any supposed interest of the trustee'. . . in securing the cancellation of relator's contract." Id. at 386, 1 N.E.2d at 1008. "The common-law rule
that nobody may be a judge in his own cause does not apply where members of the
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been held, further, that a reviewing court does not even have "jurisdiction" to consider statements by a deciding officer which tended to show
that he had prejudged the case in favor of removal ;272 but the decision
is more properly explainable in terms of the insufficiency of such statements to show that the prejudgment was improperly motivated and
that it could not be overcome by evidence favorable to the person under
investigation. In an earlier case, similar statements were held to have
been properly excluded from evidence by the trial court "as not being
pertinent to the issue" ;273 but statements of the deciding officers that it
would be useless for the person under inquiry to offer any defense
because it was their intention to dismiss him are relevant to the question whether the consideration given to his case was so unfair as to be
invalid.27 4 Similarly, evidence that the deciding officers acted in bad
faith on the basis of trumped-up charges which they brought is sufficient,
2 75
if believed, to warrant setting aside their action.
When an administrative determination affecting particular persons
is accompanied by proceedings in which those persons must be given
2 77
0
an opportunity to participate, 27 notice to them is of course necessary.
Problems relating to the sufficiency of particular instances of notice have
arisen frequently in the reported cases. The basic requirement is that
the notice be adequate under the circumstances. 278 It may in some situations relate simply to the time and place of a meeting or hearing; in
others the specification of issues may be required.
Quite rudimentary, but legally adequate in some situations, is the
notice given by a statute which sets the time and place for a tribunal to
meet. Notice of this type, however, is valid only where the persons
board . . . are performing their official duties. . .

."

State ex rel. Szweda v. Davies,

198 Ind. 30, 38, 152 N.E. 174, 176 (1926). The situation is not different from what
it would be if the deciding officer were authorized to proceed in a managerial capacity,
without a hearing. See School City of Crawfordsville v. Montgomery, 99 Ind. App.
526, 187 N.E. 57, 188 N.E. 695 (1933).
272. School City of Peru v. State ex rel. Youngblood, 212 Ind. 255, 7 N.E.2d 176,
9 N.E.2d 80 (1937).
273. State ex rel. Szweda v. Davies, 198 Ind. 30, 152 N.E. 174 (1926).
274. State ex rel. Felthoff v. Richards, 203 Ind. 637, 645-647, 180 N.E. 596, 599
(1932). See also Colemon v. City of Gary, 220 Ind. 446, 44 N.E.2d 101 (1942).
275. Shira v. State ex rel. Ham, 187 Ind. 441, 119 N.E. 833 (1918); Keener School
Township v. Eudaly, 93 Ind. App. 627, 175 N.E. 363 (1931).
276. Determinations which affect particular parties but are not accompanied by
the right of participation include the summary abatement of nuisances and temporary
orders under section 5 of the adjudication act. Whether these should be called adjudications is simply a matter of terminology. See Part 1, note 76 m.rpra, with regard to
whether nuisance abatement is adjudication within the meaning of the adjudication act
of 1947.
277. Harmon v. Bolley, 187 Ind. 511, 120 N.E. 33 (1918) ; Fries v. Brier, 111 Ind.
65, 11 N.E. 958 (1886).
278. Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455, 114 N.E. 965 (1917).
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affected have matters to bring up 279 or have reason to believe that questions of concern to them will arise-as is true, for example, if property
tax assessments in a given area or for a given'type of enterprise must
be determined at a particular meeting. 28 0 The mere possibility that a
taxpayer's assessment may be reviewed and changed is not enough to
bind him by a statutory notice of the date of a meeting. 28 ' Notice by
publication may sometimes suffice, if it specifies the matters to be considered. 28 2 Personal notice is of course adequate if it is timely and
sufficiently precise in content. Failure to accord the notice required by
law, unless cured in some manner, invalidates subsequent administrative
28
action adverse to the party who was entitled to receive it.

The well-known doctrine that notice which is not required by law
is not legally effective even when it has actually been given has received
impressive support in this State. In Kuntz v. Sumption2s 4 the Court
concluded that a county board of equalization was without power to
increase an individual's personal property tax assessment under a statute
which was held invalid because it did not provide for notice to him that
the matter would be considered by the board. The taxpayer had appeared
before the board as a witness, pursuant to subpoena; but he did so under
protest and the Court held that the actual notice so accorded was ineffective because it was not required to be given to the taxpayer in his
capacity as such. Hence it rested in the discretion of the board whether
to accord notice or not; and the statute failed for want of an essential
provision. The Court noted, however, that had there been a basis in
the statute for "an assumption of the right to give notice," and had
there been some notice given which was effective even though "not . . .
in strict conformity to law," the resulting administrative action might
have been valid.28 5 All of the pertinent cases cited by the Court in support of this observation involved statutes which made specific provision
for notice, the adequacy of which was questioned or which had not been
279. Wilkins v. State, 113 Ind. 514, 16 N.E. 192 (1887) (license.applicant).
280. Hyland v. Brazil Block Coal Co., 128 Ind. 335,26 N.E. 672 (1890) ; Pittsburgh,
C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 133 Ind. 625, 33 N.E. 432 (1892), aff'd 154 U.S. 421 (1894) ;
Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 133 Ind. 513, 33 N.E. 421 (1892), aff'd 154
U.S. 439 (1894).
281. Kuntz v. Sumption, 117 Ind. 1, 19 N.E. 474 (1888).
282. Id. at 3, 19 N.E. at 475. See also International Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Board of
Comm'rs, 30 Ind. App. 12, 17, 65 N.E. 297 (1902). Eaton v. Union County National
Bank, 141 Ind. 159, 40 N.E. 693 (1894).
283. Ropp v. Fulton, 183 Ind. 251, 108 N.E. 946 (1915); Kiphart v. Pittsburgh,
C.C. & St. L. Ry., 7 Ind. App. 122, 34 N.E. 375 (1893); Gavin v. Board of Comm'rs,
104 Ind. 201, 3 N.E. 846 (1885).
284. 117 Ind. 1, 19 N.E. 474 (1888). This case is frequently cited in other jurisdictions and in the literature on the subject.
285. Id. at 3, 19 N.E. at 475.
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followed precisely. Many years later in Hdye v. Board of Commission1
5 the Court held that the requirement of notice, which had actually
been given, was implicit in a statutory provision for a hearing before
the removal of a county highway superintendent from office. The conclusion that an implied provision for notice was valid rested in part on
the ground that there is no constitutional requirement for notice and
opportunity for hearing before a removal from office, but no logical or
practical reason appears why a provision cannot be implied for constitutional reasons as well. It is true that the time and manner of notice must
in such a case be determined administratively; but judicial review will
be available as a remedy against inadequate notice not fulfilling the reers,

28 7
quirement of procedural due process of law.

Where notice of a given variety is required and not given, but
where actual knowledge comes to the attention of the person entitled to
notice, who responds in the same way as he would have responded to
the required notice, the omission is cured and the resulting administrative action is valid.28 8

As to certain proceedings, furthermore, from

which private rights may arise, a party who has not received notice or
has received only defective notice may be estopped to take advantage of
the omission or defect, even though he has not responded but has remained silent in the face of knowledge which he has. The estoppel
arises if he has knowingly permitted others to rely upon the assumption
28 9
that the proceedings are valid.

Want of substantive injury to the party failing to receive notice will,
at least, defeat his attempt to secure equitable relief against the resulting
administrative action. Hence a taxpayer who has not been notified or
has received defective notice of an increase in his assessment cannot
286. 209 Ind. 245, 198 N.E. 33 (1935).
287. An excellent discussion of this whole problem will be found in GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 352-361 (2d ed. 1947).
In Vandalia R.R.
v. Railroad Comm'n, 182 Ind. 382, 101 N.E. 85 (1913), the Court pointed to the notice
and hearing administratively accorded to the railroad company before an order was
issued requiring the installation by railroads of headlights conforming to certain specifications, as a basis for concluding that due process had been accorded. The notice and
hearing were not in terms required by the statute. The proceeding was a rule-making
one, however, and it is doubtful whether constitutional requirements as to procedure
were applicable to it.
288. Deniston v. Terry, 141 Ind. 677, 41 N.E. 143 (1895); International Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Board of Commr's, 30 Ind. App. 12, 65 N.E. 297 (1902), differentiating
Eaton v. Union County Bank, 141 Ind. 159, 40 N.E. 693 (1894).
289. Cf. Scudder v. Jones, 134 Ind. 547, 32 N.E. 221 (1893); Pretzinger v. Harness, 114 Ind. 491, 16 N.E. 495 (1887). These cases involved notice in relation to
special assessments, in situations where a contractor had done work in reliance upon
the validity of the proceedings. Bondholders might also be the persons protected by
the estoppel.
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bring an injunction suit against collection of the resulting tax without
alleging that he does not actually owe the money. 2 90
The constitutional requirement of notice and opportunity to be
heard, where it applies, may be satisfied by a judicial proceeding, following the administrative action or before that action can take effect,
even where there is no provision for administrative proceedings that
satisfy the requirement. 2

1

The judicial proceeding should be held ade-

quate, however, only where the merits of issues which the person affected
is entitled to dispute are open to determination by the court; judicial
review not extending to these issues would not be sufficient. In other
jurisdictions the cases have at times overlooked this point. 2 92 In Indiana
the question has been examined in cases involving special assessments
for improvements, whose collection in the last analysis, if the obligor
chooses to resist, can only be effected in a proceeding to foreclose a
lien on his property. Whether the individual's assessment is justified
by the benefits conferred is the principal matter upon which he should
be entitled to a hearing. It has been held that the foreclosure proceeding,
of which he is notified, satisfies the constitutional requirement of notice
and opportunity for hearing. In Kiger v. Town of Winchester,293 the
statute specifically permitted the objector to litigate the question whether
his property was "benefited to the amount assessed against the same. '' 29 4
In Garvin v. Daw snuin,29 5 the Court concluded that the enforcement
proceeding "could only be taken in pursuance of notice, and in a court
in which ample opportunity would be afforded for questioning . . . all

. . . matters respecting the legality and amount of the assessment, or
290. See Part I, note 49 supra, where the cited cases involve alleged administrative failure to accord the notice in assessment proceedings which is required by
statute. See also People's Gas, etc., Co. v. Harrell, 36 Ind. App. 588, 76 N.E. 318

(1905); Fell v. West, 35 Ind. App. 20, 73 N.E. 719 (1905).
291. A leading case to this effect in the Supreme Court of the United States is
Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393 (1934).
292. See DAvis, ADmINISTRATIVE LAW 268 (1951).
293. 141 Ind. 694, 40 N.E. 265 (1895).
294. Id. at 645, 40 N.E. at 266.
295. 114 Ind. 429, 16 N.E. 826 (1888). The result in this case might have been
rested also on the ground that the apportionment of the assessments was made by the
common council of Evansville, a local legislative body. Where such a body acts, the
prevailing view is that notice and hearing are not required, at least if some uniform
rule (e.g., apportionment according to area or value) is prescribed. See St. Louis S.W.
Ry. v. Nattin, 277 U.S. 157 (1928); Browning v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396 (1926); Hancock v. City of Muskogee, 250 U.S. 454 (1919). See also Potts, Due Process in Local
Assessments, 12 A.B.A.J. 457 (1926); Note, 4 TEx. L. REv. 350 (1926). It is not intended that this discussion of problems of notice in special improvement situations,
which arise under varying statutes and often become extremely complicated, shall serve
as a guide to the subject, beyond indicating the general principles involved. For an
indication of the nature of the problems involved see Kirsch v. Braun, 153 Ind. 247, 53
N.E. 1082 (1899).
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which might cause a legitimate cause of grievance to the propertyholder. ' 29 6 Accordingly these proceedings were held to be sufficient.
Another situation in which judicial proceedings might serve as a
substitute for administrative notice and opportunity for hearing arose
in two cases in which taxpayers, who resisted increased assessments of
general property taxes, did so as non-resident executors of estates involved in local probate proceedings. The statutes did not provide for notice of increases in assessments to non-residents. In addition to sustaining
the validity of increasing the assessments upon local property belonging to
non-residents without notice to them, the Court pointed out that in these
cases the taxpayers would be able to obtain hearings in the probate
297
proceedings.
A unique problem is presented by increases made by township or
county tax assessors in the valuations of personal property in taxpayers'
returns and by the addition of property not included in returns. In
Kuntz v. Sumption,298 the statement is made that "after a citizen has
listed his property, no change in the list can be compulsorily made by
an officer or tribunal whose decision is final, until, by due process of
law, he has had an opportunity to vindicate the correctness of his list
or resist an attempt to increase the valuation." 29 9 Under a different view,
however, the taxpayer's return, being for the information of the assessor,
30
contains no determination which requires any formality for its change.
The matter is covered by a statute which, taken'literally, would seem
to require notice to the taxpayer before a departure from the valuations
shown in his return can be made. Its terms provide that "[w]henever
the township assessor shall discover or receive credible information, or
have reason to believe . . . that any person, company or corporation
has for any cause omitted to list any part of his, her or their property,
or has not returned the full value thereof . . . he shall proceed to correct his list. . . ." provided, however, that ten days' notice and an opportunity to appear and be heard shall be given to any resident owner
of the property involved before the change is made.80 1 This statute is
296.
297.

Garvin v. Daussman, 114 Ind. 429, 436, 16 N.E. 826, 830 (1888).
Gallup v. Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196, 56 N.E. 443 (1900) ; Buck v. Miller, 147 Ind.

586, 45 N.E. 647 (1896).
298. 117 Ind. 1, 19 N.E. 474 (1888).
299. Id. at 2, 19 N.E. at 474.

300. See Chicago & Erie R.R. v. John, 150 Ind. 113, 48 N.E. 640 (1897), where,
however, the return of the railroad company was made, pursuant to statute, to the

county auditor who transmitted it to the assessor. This procedure made it clear to the
Court that "the assessor places the primary valuation upon property of the character
of that in question here" and that, consequently, "notice to the owner could not be
regarded as essential" to a departure from the return in making the assessment. Id. at

116,48 N.E. at 641.
301. IND. ANN.

STAT.

§ 64-1025 (Burns 1951).
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said, however, to apply only to changes in completed assessments, presumably for earlier years, and not to departures from taxpayers' listings
in making original assessments.3 02 The absence of a requirement of
similar notice to the taxpayer before his list can be departed from in
the process of original assessment can perhaps be rationalized on the
theory that the taxpayer has an interest which he knows he must protect
before the assessor during the statutory assessing period and hence has
all the notice to which he is entitled. 30 3 Even a decent minimum of
efficiency in the tax laws would, of course, reject such a theory and
30 4
require notice by mail to the taxpayer if his list is not to be accepted.
The Supreme Court of the State has adhered, until recently, to
the view that departures in a notice from the strict requirements of a
statute specifying the contents and manner of the notice does not invalidate the notice if actual prejudice does not result. 80 5 The decision
in City of Ft. Wayne v. Bishop300 involves an apparent departure from
this doctrine. There, after a statutory hearing had led to the dismissal
of a policewoman from her position, the Court held the dismissal invalid
because the statement of charges against her, which the Court held was
required to be entered of record in advance of the hearing,3 0 7 was inadequate in form, although the facts relied upon were entered. No facts
were recited in the opinion or urged in the briefs to show that the officer
was misled or handicapped in preparing her case by the want of com302. Chicago & Erie R.R. v. John, 150 Ind. 113, 48 N.E. 460 (1897). See also
Hunter Stone Co. v. Woodard, 152 Ind. 474, 53 N.E. 947 (1899).
303. See p. 310 supra.
304. Notice of real property assessments, for which the taxpayer makes no return,
is provided for in IND. ANx. STAT. § 64-1018 (Burns 1951). Notice of increases in
the assessments of all taxpayers in an area, by way of equalization, is not constitutionally required, Hubbard v. Goss, 157 Ind. 485, 62 N.E. 36 (1901), but has been accorded
by statute. State Board of Tax Comm'rs v. Jay County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n,
209 Ind. 281, 198 N.E. 777 (1935); Board of Comm'rs v. Western Electric Co., 198 Ind.
417, 153 N.E. 177 (1926).
305. See p. 312 supra. See also Klein v. Tuhey, 13 Ind. App. 74, 40 N.E. 144
(1895) ; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Edgerton, 125 Ind. 455, 25 N.E. 436 (1890).
306. 288 Ind. 304, 92 N.E.2d 544 (1950).
307. The statutory provision containing the requirement, which is set forth in the
opinion, prescribes that removal may take place after written notice has been given of
the time and place of the hearing, "and after an opportunity for a hearing is given,
if demanded, and the written reasons for such removal shall be entered upon the records"
of the board of police commissioners. It is the last clause which the Court translated
into the requirement that a statement of charges be entered in advance. It seems designed, rather, to require that the reasons for the determination, after it has been made,
be entered. The written notice actually given in the case, instead of being confined to
the time and place of the hearing, contained a statement of every statutory reason that
could have been a ground of dismissal, whereas the facts disclosed only a single specific
ground. The Court may well have been offended by this shotgun approach and have
strained to find a basis for a requirement of greater precision in future cases. An
admonition based upon an implied requirement of adequate notice, instead of a reversal
of the dismissal, might have sufficed for this purpose.
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pliance with the statute. The decision appears to be an unfortunate
concession to formalism, which ought not be followed in the future
A somewhat earlier decision displays contrasting liberality toward
an instance of possibly misleading notice in connection with a dismissal.
There a teacher was notified of her discharge for cause but was given
an opportunity, which she accepted, to resign instead. Apparently the
school authorities claimed the right to dismiss without a hearing, although
the law was otherwise. Upon the teacher's subsequent challenge to the
dismissal in a mandamus action, the Supreme Court held that any misapprehension of law she might have been under, even if the school
authorities contributed to it, could not overcome the waiver of procedural rights which was implicit in her letter of resignation.3 08 The
holding is technically defensible; but the question might be raised, as it
was in the Court, 30 9 whether the situation created by the school authorities' wrongful action should not have been resolved in her favor by
holding that no waiver resulting from her yielding to the desire to avoid
public controversy.
The general requirements of a valid administrative hearing, where
the right to a hearing is secured by constitution or statute, were stated
by the Supreme Court in Coleman v. City of Gary.3 10 The hearing
requirement in that case was derived from a statutory provision for an
appeal to a municipal civil service commission from the demotion of a
patrolman by the police authorities, following a hearing by them. The
commission's rules provided for a public hearing on appeal. The Court,
noting that these rules were binding so long as they remained unchanged,311 stated that the hearing "was for the purpose of determining
whether the demotion had been justified by the facts" and that "[t]he
rule required the hearing of evidence on which to base a decision," as
well as that the hearing should, in general, be "fair." 81 2
Administrative hearings actually vary from informal meetings, such
those commonly held by officials administering the general property
tax, at which interested parties may supply evidence and state conten308. Board of School Comm'rs v. State ex rel. Bever, 211 Ind. 257, 5 N.E.2d 307

(1936).
309. Id. at 263, 6 N.E.2d at 309 (Treanor, J., dissenting).
310. 220 Ind. 446, 44 N.E.2d 101 (1942).
311. Whether there is a general principle to this effect is debatable; but it has
been applied in significant cases. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), and the
excellent discussion in GELLORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 442-451
(2d ed. 1947). Where procedural rules must be published, as the Federal Administrative Procedure Act and other administrative procedure legislation requires, an additional
reason is supplied why rules so published must be observed. See IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 60-1503, 60-1505, 60-1506 (Burns 1951).
312. Coleman v. City of Gary, 220 Ind. 446, 459, 44 N.E.2d 101, 107 (1942).
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tions, to proceedings possessing the dominant characteristics of judicial
trials. Perhaps the most significant classification of administrative hearings is that which distinguishes between those designed simply to supplement information already in the possession of the deciding authorities
and those intended to establish a record which shall be the sole basis of
decision. 31 3 Less fundamental variations involve such questions, among
others, as whether witnesses shall be sworn, whether compulsory process
to secure testimony is available, what principles of evidence shall apply,
and whether briefs or oral argument shall be permitted.
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act contains different provisions for those hearings that constitute the sole basis for the resulting
adjudications, from those applicable to hearings which do not constitute
such a basis. 31 4 The Indiana adjudication act, on the other hand, which

requires opportunity for a hearing in connection with every adjudication
to which it applies, 3 15 provides also that a record shall be made at the
hearing and that it "shall constitute the complete and exclusive record
of such hearing and determination of such agency .... ,,3, The hearing, however, may be conducted "in an informal manner and without
recourse to the technical common law rules of evidence," but with the
right of cross-examination. 3 .

The cumbersomeness and expense of

record-type hearings, which might become burdensome in relation to
many matters, is mitigated by the act's encouragement of wholly informal methods of disposing of "claims, controversies and issues" by
consent of the parties. 31 8

License applications may be passed upon in

the first instance without any right in the applicant to be heard; but a
319
rejection does not become final before opportunity for a hearing.
No statement is more common in judicial opinions dealing with
the proper conduct of administrative hearings than that, as the adjudication act also provides, "the strict rule of evidence in court does not
apply" to administrative proceedings. 320 Hence it might be supposed
that administrative freedom in the admission of evidence deemed to
have probative value for specialized purposes, without reference to the
313. This distinction corresponds to the classification of judicial review proceedings into those confined to the administrative record and those not so confined. See Part
I, pp. 8-11 supra.
314. 60 STAr. 237, 239-242, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1004-1008 (1946),. The provision for
judicial review of fact determinations is similarly differentiated. Id. § 1009(e) (B) (5).
315. As to the meaning of adjudication under the act see Part I, note 76 supra..

IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-3009 (Burns 1951).
Id. § 63-3008.
Id. § 63-3007.
Id. §§ 63-3024, 63-3025.
Patton Park, Inc. v. Anderson, 222 Ind. 448, 457, 53 N.E.2d 771, 774, 54
N.E.2d 277 (1944); State ex rel Byers v. School City of Evansville, 219 Ind. 288, 37
N.E.2d 934 (1941).
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
common law rules as such but, rather, with regard to logical principles
of proof, including some aspects of the common law rules, 321 would be
emphasized in the cases. Actually this administrative freedom is viewed
more largely as a concession, using the common law rules as a point of
departure. The concession is kept effective by holding that determination will not be set aside upon judicial review merely because incompetent
evidence was admitted, so long as competent evidence also is present to
support it.32 2 In this State, nevertheless, judicial opinions in workmen's

compensation cases continue to enjoin observance of many of the common
law rules of evidence upon the Industrial Board. Thus, as to the Board,
"[t] he rule against hearsay testimony has prevailed in Indiana for many
years. ' 3 23 There is in fact an impressive body of appellate doctrine
relating to the admissibility of evidence in workmen's compensation
hearings. 24 That no similar body of doctrine has developed with reference to other administrative tribunals is perhaps due to the relative
infrequency of cases involving their decisions and to the greater dissimilarity which prevails between their determinations and those of
courts than exists between the decisions of the Industrial Board and
judicial decisions.
Even in a proceeding leading to a determination which is required
to be on the record of a hearing, the administrative agency may wish
to take official notice of relevant facts without receiving evidence with
regard to them. Where these facts are of general notoriety and a court
might take judicial notice of them, no objection can arise. In addition,
however, facts which are not generally known but fall within the agency's
specialized competence may appropriately be noticed by it, subject to a
321. See the clear, informed discussion of problems of evidence in quasi-judicial
administrative hearings in BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIvE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 170-181, 194-206 (1942). "The exclusion (under a technical exclusionary
rule as to competency) of logically probative evidence whose actual probative value
could be appraised with reasonable accuracy by the tribunal, is more likely to lead to
the wrong result than the admission of such evidence would be. A trained hearing
officer's experience, and his familiarity with the particular field of inquiry, should often
enable him to appraise more accurately the weight properly to be accorded to such
evidence than could a jury or even a judge unfamiliar with the field of litigation. The
precautionary measures that are thought necessary in judicial proceedings would, in my

judgment, often operate as an unwarranted hindrance to rational inquiry in a quasijudicial proceeding." Id. at 175.
322. Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 116-117, 26 N.E.2d 399, 408409 (1940). The scope of the requirement that there be competent evidence is discussed
at p. 327 infra.
323. White Swan Laundry v. Muzolf, 111 Ind. App. 691, 693, 42 N.E.2d 391, 392
(1942). See also Asbestos Insulating & Roofing Co. v. Schrock, 114 Ind. App. 177,
N.E.2d 395 (1943).
324. See SMALL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW OF INDIANA 384-392 (1950).
The basic principle continues to be that the common law rules are not binding, with
the restrictive doctrines operating by way of exception.
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right in parties adversely affected to offer refutation. An example arose
in this State recently in an unemployment compensation case in which
the claimant was denied compensation because he had become unavailable for work. He objected because "official notice was taken by the
Referee of the lack of work opportunities in Florida and the existence
thereof in Indianapolis. ' 3 2 5 The Appellate Court, noting that "by express
legislative mandate the rights of the parties in these cases need not be
determined under the common law or statutory rules of evidence and
other technical rules of procedure," approved the statement of a Pennsylvania court in a similar case, that administrative determinations may
turn "upon specialized data and information peculiarly accessible to
administrative agencies, and of which they may take official notice just
as a court may take judicial notice." The information so noticed should,
however, "be placed upon the record, and the parties apprised of it, so
that the essentials of a fair hearing are preserved.

'3 2 6

Since the referee's

determination was reviewed by the Review Board after its communication to the parties, the requirement of opportunity for refutation had
been met.32 7 The Court's recognition of the validity of the notice device
in administrative proceedings is a wise encouragement to administration
which is efficient without becoming unfair:
The final stage in an administrative proceeding leading to a decision
order
is, of course, the formulation of the agency's conclusions. A
or
simple announcement of the decision or order may suffice for practical
purposes, as is frequently the case in trial courts and with respect to
appellate decisions in some jurisdictions, which are not accompanied by
325. Walton v. Wilhelm, 120 Ind. App. 218, 227, 91 N.E.2d 373, 377 (1950).
326. Id. at 227, 91 N.E.2d at 376, 377.
327. Two opposite theories are in vogue with regard to the validity of providing
for the refutation of facts noticed by a tribunal. According to the one, such facts
become indisputable; according to the other, the possibility of refutation continues, and,
where necessary to secure opportunity for refutation, the facts noticed should be conveyed
to the parties. See DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 477-478 (1951). As to the value of
official notice and the various ways of communicating the facts noticed (statement in
the course of a hearing, communication in an interim report, etc.) see BENjA IN, op.
cit. supra note 321, at 206-221; REP. Axr'y GEN. Comx. AD. PRoc. 71-73 (1941). The
Model Administrative Procedure Act of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
provides in section 9(4) that "[a]gencies may take notice of judicially cognizable facts
and in addition may take notice of general, technical, or scientific facts within their
specialized knowledge. Parties shall be notified either before or during the hearing, or
by reference in preliminary reports or otherwise, of the material so noticed, and they
shall be afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed." The American Law
Institute's Model Code of Evidence adopts the opposite theory, that facts noticed may
not be disputed; but it provides in Rule 804 that "[t]he judge shall inform the parties
of the tenor of any matter to be noticed judicially by him and afford each of them
reasonable opportunity to present to him information relevant to the propriety of taking
such judicial notice or to the tenor of the matter to be noticed." It may be doubted
whether in practical operation any material difference is likely to arise between a dispute
over the truth of facts noticed and one over the propriety of noticing them.
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opinions. In other instances, agencies, like courts, have resorted to
opinions to state their reasoning and conclusions. Of late, formal findings of fact which frequently are numbered, preceding the statement of
conclusions and opinion, if any, have been used increasingly. The Supreme and Appellate Courts of this State, in common with courts elsewhere, have tended to impose a requirement that findings of this character accompany administrative decisions based upon the record of a
hearing.
In 1948, the Supreme Court, relying upon decisions of the United
States and Illinois Supreme Courts, held that an order of the Public
Service Commission unaccompanied by enumerated findings could not
stand ;328 in 1950, it rested the same conclusion on a 1941 statutory
amendment which provided that the Commission should "in all controversial proceedings heard by it be an impartial fact-finding body and
shall make its orders in such cases upon the facts impartially found by
it."' 329

It may be doubted whether the statute was directed to this

point,8 30

but the result is nevertheless desirable. A requirement of findings has been embodied in the Workmen's Compensation Act from the
beginning. 3 31 The Employment Security Act requires the deputy before
whom a claim is made in the first instance, and who does not conduct a
hearing, to determine the claim "on the basis of the facts found by him."
A referee, to whom the matter may then be taken, conducts a hearing
and may "affirm, modify or reverse the findings of fact and decision of
the deputy." The Review Board, which may then be invoked, is required
to notify the parties of its decision, "together with its reasons therefor.' 3

32

These provisions have been translated into a requirement that

a decision of the Review Board be accompanied by findings when it is
presented to a court for review. 33 3 The adjudication act requires that
"informal findings of facts" be made either "by direct statement or by
reference to the particular charges made in the complaint before [the]
agency.

334
'

328. Kosciusko County R.E.M.C. v. Public Service Comm'n, 225 Ind. 666, 77
N.E.2d 572 (1948).
329. Wabash Valley Coach Co. v. Arrow Coach Lines, 228 Ind. 609, 94 N.E.2d

753 (1950).
330. The provision inquestion, which iscontained inIND. ANN. STAT. § 54-112
(Burns 1951), was part of an enactment that dealt with the functions of the Commission
and of the Public Counselor in relation to each other. The requirement of impartiality,
rather than that of findings, is what the legislature appears to have had in mind.
331. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1511 (Burns 1951); Inland Steel Co. v. Lambert, 66
Ind. App. 246, 118 N.E. 162 (1917).
332. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 52-1542b-52-1542d (Burns 1951).
333. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Review Board, 121 Ind. App. 227, 98 N.E.2d 512

(1951).
334. IND.

ANN. STAT.

§ 63-3010 (Burns 1951).
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According to accepted theory, findings of fact should deal with
basic or "ultimate" facts, and not with either evidentiary facts or conclusions of law. 33 5 These distinctions are difficult to apply, since they
involve differences in degree rather than in kind; but they possess genuine
substance. Whether a woman can qualify for statutory benefits of some
sort may turn, for example, upon whether she is a decedent's widow;
and this question may depend on whether she was validly married to the
decedent. A finding that she is the widow will not be particularly helpful;
a recital, on the other hand, of all the circumstances of her marriage
shown by the evidence would be cumbersome and might fail to state
the essential point. A statement that she became the wife of the decedent
in a certain place on a certain day or that habit and repute in a particular
place during a specified period established the marriage would, by contrast, state the essentials. It would give assurance that the agency had
actually determined the issue, would acquaint the parties with the basis
of the decision, and would enable a reviewing court to check whether
the finding had adequate support in the record. Contemporary doctrine
indicates that findings of this variety should in each instance accompany
an agency's adjudicative decision 33 6 to which the requirement of findings
attaches, although the exact meaning of the requirement has not emerged
337
with the degree of clarity that might be desired.
335. Guevara v. Inland Steel Co., 121 Ind. App. 390, 95 N.E.2d 714 (1950) ; Inland
Steel Co. v. Lambert, 66 Ind. App. 246, 250, 118 N.E. 162, 163 (1917).
336. "The failure of the Public Service Commission to find specific facts upon
which its order was based . . . makes it illegal and unlawful." Wabash Valley Coach
Co. v. Arrow Coach Lines, 228 Ind. 609, 616, 94 N.E.2d 753, 756 (1950). See also Cole
v. Sheehan Const. Co., 222 Ind. 274, 53 N.E.2d 172 (1944).
337. The current requirement as to findings in workmen's compensation cases,
based on Cole v. Sheehan Const. Co., 222 Ind. 274, 53 N.E.2d 172 (1944), is that "[ilt
is the duty of the Industrial Board to make a finding of fact on every issue presented
to it." Guevara v. Inland Steel Co., 120 Ind. App. 47, 51-52, 88 N.E.2d 398, 400 (1949).
See also Moore v. Staton, 120 Ind. App. 339, 92 N.E.2d 564 (1950). In the Cole case
the Appellate Court subsequently held that the requirement of a finding as to the
marriage of the claimant and the decedent was satisfied by the statement that they "were
not husband and wife" and that the claimant "was not the common law wife of the
deceased." Cole v. Sheehan Const. Co., 115 Ind. App. 303, 307, 57 N.E.2d 625, 627
(1945). In the Guevara case the Court later accepted as adequate a finding that "the
common-law relationship of appellant and decedent did not exist openly and notoriously
for a period of not less than five years immediately preceding the death of the decedent."
Hence their relationship did not satisfy a statutory condition of the claimant's eligibility,
that they have lived together for five years. Guevara v. Inland Steel Co., 121 Ind. App.
390, 396, 95 N.E.2d 714, 717 (1950). Previously the Board had erred because its findings
covered only the parties' residence in Indiana, although they had previously resided together in Illinois. The new finding was attacked on the ground that it was not sufficiently
specific, but the Court held that the deliberate omission of the words "in Indiana"
rendered it sufficiently pointed and that it clearly covered the entire period during
vhich the parties lived together. A finding which stated the length of their residence
in each jurisdiction would have been preferable. See SMALL, WORKIMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW OF INDIANA 392-396 (1950), where it is pointed out that, in contrast to earlier
holdings with respect to the Industrial Board, the more recent cases have on the whole
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A further significant point with respect to some agency orders
involves the extent to which they should be specific in requiring particular"
action on the part of persons addressed. This question may turn on the
provisions of the governing statute. In Southern IndianaRy. v. Railroad
Commission,"S the Commission was held not to be required to specify
the division of a joint rate which it ordered two railroads to place in
effect, since the statute permitted them to apply subsequently for an order
covering this point in the event they could not agree between themselves.
In New York Central R.R. v. Public Service Conmmission,33 9 an order
of the Commission was held to be deficient because it did not specify
the manner in which an inter-connection between two railroads, which it
required, should be constructed; for here the statute stated that the
specifications should be laid down.$40 The problem involved is significant
especially in statutory drafting, since under some circumstances it may
be of advantage to have the details specified in an order, whereas under
others freedom for the party regulated, or the imposition of responsibility
upon that party, may be preferable. 4' If a statute is left indefinite, the
42
courts must do the best they can with it.A

43
F. Scope of Judicial Review in General

Some aspects of the review which courts give to the determinations
of administrative agencies have already been discussed. These include
the governing philosophy as to the relation of courts to agencies3 44 and
the requirements as to agency procedure which have resulted from reaccepted findings which amount to little more than legal conclusions. In Vendome
Hotel v. Gibson, 122 Ind. App. 604, 105 N.E.2d 907, 106 N.E.2d 474 (1952), p. 326 infra,
a clear-cut disposition of the case would have been aided by specific findings as to
facts underlying the only stated conclusion of fact, that the accident arose out of and
in the course of the employment.
338. 172 Ind. 113, 87 N.E. 966 (1909).
339. 191 Ind. 627, 134 N.E. 282 (1922).
340. In Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 171 Ind. 189, 86 N.E.
328 (1908), an order under the same statutory provision was adequate in content and
was sustained.
341. In general, perhaps, individuals and small businesses need guidance in such
matters, whereas large concerns may be in a better position to determine their own
course and accept the hazard of possible unintentional non-compliance. The needed
assurance that the public interest will be served adequately must also be taken into
account.
342. See Purnell v. Maysville Water Co., 193 Ky. 85, 234 S.W. 967 (1921);
FREUND, ADMINIsTRATIvE PowERs OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY

149 (1928).

343. Time and space limitations prevent the detailed treatment originally planned
for this topic. An adequate critique of the judicial review of substantive agency
determinations must proceed field by field. Here, only limited aspects of the subject,
possessing general significance, will be discussed.
344. Part I, pp. 2-8 supra.
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ported judicial decisions. 345

The scope of judicial review is usually

stated in terms of categories of matters which a reviewing court may
make the basis of setting aside agency action, of disregarding it, of
preventing or denying enforcement, or of awarding relief because of
what the agency or its officers have done. These categories have varied
historically and in relation to different kinds of proceedings in which
review has been obtained.
The traditional non-statutory remedies were available simply to
prevent action outside of an agency's jurisdiction, 46 to correct a usurpation of authority, 34 7 to compel action illegally withheld, 34 8 or to secure

relief from the effects of action taken without jurisdiction.3 49 If, today,
statutory review of broader scope is available, non-statutory review of
lesser scope may sometimes still be obtained independently in order to
prevent administrative abuse.350 Yet the traditional narrowly-stated
bases for judicial action are capable of indefinite expansion. 3 5 1 A considerable part of the history of judicial review of administrative determinations has consisted of the development of such limited conceptions
to the point where they might embrace whatever aspects of agency functioning were deemed to be in need of judicial correction. It is perhaps
for this reason that the Supreme Court was led to say a few years ago
that in addition to inquiring into the jurisdiction of the Industrial Board,
"[a]ll the other powers of the judiciary with respect to the review of
administrative orders may be said to be embraced in the duty to determine
if the requirements of due process have been met."' 352 Judicial review of

the Industrial Board's decisions is statutory, however, 35 3 and it is un345. See p. 304 mtpra.
346. Prohibition, injunction, and, in most jurisdictions, certiorari.
347. Quo warranto, or information.
348. Mandamus, or mandate, and mandatory injunction.
349. Habeas corpus and damage actions.
350. See Part I, pp. 11-12 supra.
351. An outstanding example in the federal system is the expansion of the concept of jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings to review orders for the deportation
of aliens. Commencing with the theory that unconstitutional procedure results in failure
of jurisdiction and that the fact of alienage is jurisdictional and may therefore be
inquired into by a court, the federal judiciary expanded their review of deportation
orders by slow degrees until it came to embrace substantially the same categories of
procedural and substantive questions as apply in the judicial review of many other
administrative actions. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) ; Kessler v. Strecker, 207
U.S. 22 (1939) ; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922) ; Kwock Jan Fat v. White,
253 U.S. 454 (1920). The new Immigration and Nationality Act enacts into statute
substantially those procedural requirements that had previously been evolved judicially.
66 STAT. 209 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. § 12526 (Supp. 1952).
352. Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 117, 26 N.E.2d 399, 409 (1940).
See also Peabody Coal Co. v. Lambermont, 220 Ind. 525, 44 N.E.2d 827 (1942).
353. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1512 (Burns 1951): An award may be reviewed "for
errors of law under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil
actions."
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necessary to conclude that all of the matters which a court may make
354
the basis of reversing the Board fall under the rubric of due process.
It is enough that the statute authorizes these matters to be reviewed and
that it does not call upon a court to invade the administrative province
in reviewing them.355 Even in non-statutory review, some remedies involve avowed judicial determination of questions of legality, as dis3 56
tinguished from constitutionality.
The scope of judicial review of administrative determinations that
has come to be regarded as normal, both under statutes and in the application of the developed non-statutory remedies,3 57 has been stated in
various ways. The recent administrative procedure legislation, adopted
and proposed,35 8 contains the most significant formulations of this sort.
None is preferable to that of the Indiana adjudication act, which provides that, on review of an adjudicative order or determination, the
agency's "finding, decision or determination" may be set aside if the
court finds it to be:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law; or
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity; or
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or short of statutory right; or
Without observance of procedure required by law; or
359
Unsupported by substantial evidence ....

354. It may be doubted, for example, whether an award based on a finding which
is not supported by substantial evidence is a violation of due process. If there has
been a determination untainted by fraud or abuse which would invalidate it for constitutional reasons, it may yet be infected by error which a reviewing court is supposed
to correct. The distinction, of course, is merely one of words where the right to review
is clear. Where the right is not clear and non-statutory means of review have been
stretched to provide it, the concept of jurisdiction, equally with that of due process, has
provided the basis for the extension. Cf. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Moyer, 108 Ind.
App. 198, 210, 27 N.E.2d 905, 910 (1940) : "It is the general rule that courts are inclined
to treat defects that are not plainly jurisdictional as irregularities rather than as
illegalities." This statement does not disclose why there may not be illegalities which,
while calling for correction, are yet not jurisdictional in the sense that, for example,
would subject the resulting order to collateral attack
355. See Part I, p. 5 supra.
356. Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 533-534, 190 N.E. 438, 443 (1934).
357. In Public Service Comm'n v. City of Indianapolis, 193 Ind. 37, 137 N.E. 705
(1923), the Court declined to extend its review in a non-statutory injunction suit
beyond the questions of fraud and jurisdiction in the strict sense. Commission determinations of fact were taken as conclusive. In Public Service Comm'n v. City of LaPorte,
207 Ind. 462, 193 N.E. 668 (1935), the Court made the transition to a much broader
scope of review in a statutory proceeding to enjoin the enforcement of an order.
358.

§1009(e)

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE

PRocEDuRE AcT § 10(3),

60 STAT.

237, 5 U.S.C.

(1946); MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT proposed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, §§ 6(2), 12(7) (1946).
359. InD. ANN. STAT. §§ 63-3014, 63-3018 (Burns 1951).

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 325
These categories, although reasonably clear, 360 are by no means entirely definite. For example, whether the objection to a given order or
determination is based upon an alleged abuse of discretion, a departure
from the governing law, or want of substantial evidence to support the
facts found, may be difficult to determine or at least to state. In New
York Central R.R. v. Public Service Commission,361 the Commission's
refusal to permit the discontinuance of an agency railroad station was
attacked on the grounds that there was no substantial evidence to support
it "and that the order was not rendered according to law." The facts
appear to have been undisputed before the court; the character of the
community, the volume of railroad business, and the cost of the station
to the railroad were shown clearly and without contradiction. The real
dispute was whether, upon these facts, the Commission made a defensible
judgment in deciding that the agency station should be continued. The
Supreme Court held that it did, pointing to the advantages enjoyed by
the railroad, the obligations imposed upon it, and the needs of the community; yet the Court speaks also of the Commission as "the final arbiter
of the facts involved" and of the Court's inability "to substitute its
opinion for the opinion of the commission, upon evidence sufficient to
justify the commission's finding."3 612
In Klipsch v. IndianaAlcoholic Beverage Cominission,3 63 the statute
providing for judicial review of certain license refusals stated only, as
to scope of review, that the Court should direct the Commission to issue
a permit which it found to have been denied on "capricious, arbitrary, or
political grounds." In the particular instance a beer wholesaler's license
had been refused because the Commission found-justifiably, according
to the Court-that the community would not support another such enterprise. The Court concluded that the statute did not confer authority
upon the Commission to take economic factors into account and that the
refusal was invalid. It would appear that an error of law was involved;
but the Court held that the invalidity fell into the category of capricious
or arbitrary action which could be set aside under the statute.3 64
Since a reviewing court is free to differ with the agency upon questions of law but is supposed to overrule a finding of fact only if it is
360. For a sound development of the distinction between questions of law and
questions of fact see e.g., Russell v. Johnson, 220 Ind. 648, 46 N.E.2d 219 (1943);
Rhoden v. Smith & Decker Electric Co., 107 Ind. App. 152, 23 N.E.2d 306 (1939).
361. 212 Ind. 329, 7 N.E.2d 957 (1937).
362. Id. at 336, 7 N.E.2d at 959.
363. 215 Ind. 616, 21 N.E.2d 701 (1939).
364. See also Smith v. Lippman, 222 Ind. 261, 53 N.E.2d 157 (1944), holding
that an order which failed to leave to a property owner the option, secured to him
by the statute, to eliminate a fire hazard by either making repairs or razing the building
which constituted the hazard, was "unlawful, arbitrary, and unreasonable."
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unsupported by substantial evidence, the distinction between questions of
fact and questions of law may represent the difference between affirmance
and reversal of an agency order or determination. In Vendome Hotel v.
Gibson,8 65 the question was whether the loss of fingers by an employee
who reached into an ice machine while it was operating, to secure ice for
her own consumption while working, resulted from an accident arising
out of and in the course of her employment. The evidentiary facts as to
the nature and location of the machine, the custom of the employees in
taking ice from it while it was not operating, and the absence of shop
rules forbidding ice to be taken from it were clear and undisputed. The
Court treated the issue as embracing the question of fact whether the
machine while operating was obviously dangerous. It sustained the Industrial Board's implied finding that it was not, which was supported by
evidence as to the appearance of the machine; and, in general, the Court
sustained as a finding of fact the Board's stated conclusion that the injury
did arise out of and in the course of the employment. Judge Achor, dissenting, 6 6 contended that the facts were undisputed and the only question
to be determined was one of law.
In Pollock v. Studebaker Corp.,8 67 the question arose whether death
caused by the decedent's striking his head on the floor of his place of
employment, when he fell in a faint, arose out of and in the course of the
employment. The Court sustained as a finding of fact the Industrial
Board's conclusion that the death did not arise out of the employment.
Judge Draper, dissenting, argued that the question was one of law, as
the Appellate Court had previously concluded.8 68 It is perhaps significant
that in the Vendome Hotel case the Court entered into considerable discussion of the merits of analogous factual situations, despite its deference
to the Industrial Board, and rather clearly agreed with the administrative
conclusion. If so, it may validly be argued that it should have accepted
responsibility for the conclusion which it undertook to support. The
Pollock case represents a frequent situation, involving the question
whether death or injury, caused by certain factors which are common to
365. 122 Ind. App. 604, 105 N.E.2d 906, 106 N.E.2d 464 (1952). In Nelson v.
Review Board, 119 Ind. App. 10, 82 N.E.2d 523 (1948), the judges took different views
as to whether the issue involved was one of fact or of law, but agreed as to the result.
In Blue Ribbon Pie Kitchens v. Long, 230 Ind. 247, 103 N.E.2d 205 (1952), the question
involved was treated as one of fact; yet underlying it was the question whether in law
a father may be a dependent under the workmen's compensation act upon the earnings
of an unemancipated minor child, to which he is entitled, when he remains responsible
for the support of the child. See also the same case in the Appellate Court, 96 N.E.2d
691 (1951) ; Vogel v. Williams, 118 Ind. App. 451, 79 N.F_2d 548 (1948).
366. Vendome Hotel v. Gibson, 122 Ind. App. 604, 616, 105 N.E.2d 906, 910 (1952).
367. 230 Ind. 622, 105 N.E.2d 513 (1952).
368. 97 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. App. 1951).
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the place of employment and other locations, may be said to arise out of
and in the course of the employment. If this question were squarely
faced and decided as one of law, the successful administration of the
Workmen's Compensation Act would probably be furthered.
The substantial evidence rule with regard to judicial review of fact
determinations has been applied in workmen's compensation cases with
variation in its phrasing.36 9 All of these formulas represent an effort
to insist that the factual conclusions of the Industrial Board must be
rationally grounded in evidence; and it is precisely this which is the
essence of the courts' duty. The courts insist, additionally, that an adequate portion of the supporting evidence must be "competent," i.e.,
admissible under the legal rules of evidence. 370 Thereby they enter upon
debatable ground; for legally incompetent evidence may at times be
rationally convincing; while, on the other hand, the fact that evidence
which forms a rational basis for a conclusion may also be legally competent does not necessarily add to its logical force.371 Nevertheless
significant authority elsewhere is in accord.3 72 Since competent circumstantial evidence may support a finding, however, and incompetent evidence may predispose to its acceptance, it is doubtful how much practical effect the requirement to which the courts have adhered actuall j
produces.

37 3

An additional confusing factor in this State is the rule that an unsuccessful claimant may not prevail upon review of a finding of fact
adverse to him unless "there is no substantial conflict in the evidence,
369. The evidence is in harmony with the finding, Inland Steel v. Lambert, 66
Ind. App. 246, 118 N.E. 162 (1917); sufficient evidence, Blackfoot Coal & Land Corp.
v. Cooper, 121 Ind. App. 313, 95 N.E.2d 639 (1950); Johnson v. P. R. Mallory Co.,
117 Ind. App. 119, 69 N.E.2d 757 (1946); Schlechtweg v. McQuay-Norris Mfg. Co.,
116 Ind. App. 375, 64 N.E.2d 664 (1946) ; any substantial evidence, Russell v. Johnson,
220 Ind. 649, 46 N.E.2d 219 (1943) ; evidence based upon a substantial factual foundation
or evidence of probative value, Pollock v. Studebaker Corp., 230 Ind. 622, 105 N.E.2d 513
(1952) ; Blue Ribbon Pie Kitchens v. Long, 230 Ind. 257, 103 N.E.2d 205 (1952);
Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (1940).
370. Any competent evidence, Kiddie Knead Baking Co. v. Bolen, 106 Ind. App.
131, 17 N.E.2d 477 (1938) ; Frazer v. McMillin & Carson, 94 Ind. App. 431, 179 N.E.
564 (1932); Hege & Co. v. Tompkins, 69 Ind. App. 273, 121 N.E. 677 (1919);
competent or legal eidence, United Paperboard Co. v. Lewis, 65 Ind. App. 356, 117
N.E. 276 (1917); legitimate evidence, Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. Haufe, 81 Ind. App.
660, 144 N.E. 844 (1924) ; some competent evidence, Consumers Co.'v. Ceislik, 69 Ind.
App. 333, 121 N.E. 832 (1919).
371. See DAvis, ADmiNISTRATIvE LAW 458-462 (1951) ; BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATmrv' ADJUDICATIoN IN THE STATE OF NEW YoRK 181-194 (1942).
372. Sada v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Calif., 11 Cal.2d 263, 78 P.2d 1127
(1938); Kadykowski v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 304 Mich. 503, 8 N.W.2d 154 (1943);
Ptaszynski v. American Sugar Refining Co., 280 App. Div. 905, 115 N.Y.S.2d 543
(3d Dep't 1952) ; Ham v. Mullins Lumber Co., 193 S.C. 66, 7 S.E.2d 612 (1940) ; Ogden
Iron Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942).
373. See Progress Laundry Co. v. Cook, 101 Ind. App. 235, 198 N.E. 807 (1935).
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and it is sufficient to compel a finding in favor of the claimant. ' 374 This
rule stems from the burden of proof which rests upon a claimant; but
it is difficult to see why that burden is not sustained by a showing that
the evidence on the other side of a particular issue of fact is insubstantial.
7
Actually the rule seems to serve chiefly as a make-weight.3 5
Another proposition, often enunciated in workmen's compensation
cases, is that on review a court "may consider only the evidence favorable to the award."3 76 This statement runs counter to the increasinglyaccepted theory that a reviewing court should consider the entire record
and should judge the substantiality of the evidence supporting a finding
in the light of opposing evidence. 7' Again, judicial opinions contain
ample indications that the evidence on both sides is considered judicially,
since it frequently is summarized and evaluated. In general, in keeping
with the substantial evidence rule, the administrative findings of fact
are permitted to prevail even when the court would have reached different
3 8
conclusions if left to itself. "

The deference of the courts toward administrative determinations,
apart from that which the substantial evidence rule enjoins with relation
to findings of fact, applies principally to discretionary determinations.
These frequently constitute the essence of an agency's work-the reason
for its existence-and it is recognized for this reason that they should
be respected.3 79 Difficulty sometimes arises when a determination turns
374. Kemble v. Aluminum Co. of America, 120 Ind. App. 72, 74-75, 90 N.E.2d
134, 135 (1950). Variants of the rule appear in other cases. See Brooks v. International Furniture Co., 122 Ind. App. 300, 305, 101 N.E.2d 197, 199 (1950): "[U]nless
the controlling facts are such that reasonable men are forced to a conclusion contrary
to that reached by the Industrial Board." See also Wright v. Peabody Coal Co., 225
Ind. 679, 77 N.E.2d 116 (1948); Poulsen v. Review Board, 110 N.E.2d 746 (Ind. App.
1953).
375. In the Kenmble and Brooks cases, note 374 supra, and Swing v. Kokomo Steel
& Wire Co., 75 Ind. App. 124, 125 N.E. 471 (1919), the evidence was heavily in
support of the finding of the Board.
376. Kemble v. Aluminum Co. of America, 120 Ind. App. 72, 90 N.E.2d 134
(1950); Leonard v. Kraft Foods Co., 122 Ind. App. 131, 102 N.F_.2d 512 (1951);
Reliance Mfg. Co. v. Ofcharchak, 119 Ind. App. 610, 88 N.E.2d 172 (1949); Jeffersonville Boat & Machine Co. v. Rager, 116 Ind. App. 521, 65 N.E.2d 638 (1946).
377. Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. OF PA. L. REv.
1026 (1941). See Note, Effect of the Taft-Hartley and Administrative Procedure Acts
on Scope of Review of Administrative Findings, 26 IND. L.J. 406 (1951).
378. Kiddie Knead Baking Co. v. Bolen, 106 Ind. App. 131, 135, 17 N.F2d 477
(1938): ". . it was within the province of the Industrial Board to determine the
ultimate facts in this case and if ... it reached a legitimate conclusion from the
evidential facts, this court cannot disturb that conclusion though it might prefer
another conclusion equally legitimate." See also Lasear, Inc. v. Anderson, 99 Ind. App.
428, 192 N.E. 762 (1934); Lazarus v. Schere, 92 Ind. App. 90, 174 N.E. 293 (1931);
National Biscuit Co. v. Roth, 83 Ind. App. 21, 146 N.E. 410 (1925).
379. Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 171 Ind. 189, 86 N.E. 328
(1908); Southern Indiana Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 172 Ind. 113, 87 N.E. 966 (1909).
See Part I, pp. 2-8 supra.
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on a statutory phrase and is therefore one of law, if, at the same time,
it involves policy considerations which may enter into the statutory interpretation. Whether an employee who is out of work is "available" for
work so as to be entitled to unemployment compensation, for example,
may be treated as a question of fact or as one of law. 380 If it is the latter,
it involves more than the ordinary meaning of a word; for related to
it is the question in many instances whether it will serve the statutory
purpose to pay benefits under the circumstances. Such questions are
sometimes called mixed questions of law and fact, or administrative
38

questions. 1
In American Bridge Co. v. Review Board,38 2 the question was

whether certain employees were involuntarily unemployed so as to entitle them to unemployment compensation. The employer, as its agreement with the union permitted, announced a shutdown for inventory
purposes and stated that, so far as practicable, employees entitled to
vacations would be expected to take them during this period. The
claimants were employees who were not entitled to vacations and hence
lost their wages during the period of the shutdown. Appellate decisions
in other jurisdictions had held that a union agreement, such as the one
in this case, made the shutdown and the resulting idleness voluntary as
to all employees; but the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the
Review Board of the Employment Security Division in sustaining the
claims in this case. Since the employer might have allowed vacations
without a shutdown, the disadvantage to the claimants was imposed
upon them and they fell within the legislative purpose "to provide for
employees who are unemployed through no fault of their own." The
Board's reasoning to this effect was "a proper interpretation to be placed
as a matter of law upon the contract in question, upon the facts of this
case, and the provisions of the . . . Act."138 3 The opinion does not express deference to the administrative conclusions; but Judge Crumpacker,
concurring, stated that "[i]t is noteworthy that administrative boards, in
jurisdictions where the decisions of the courts have not decreed otherwise, almost universally grant relief to claimants under circumstances
similar to those presently considered.138

4

Judge Royse, dissenting, ob-

jected that "the views of such administrative boards have little weight
when they conflict with the sound logic and reasoning of the able and
respectable courts which have passed on this matter." 38 5
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

Nelson v. Review Board, 119 Ind. App. 10, 82 N.E.2d 523 (1948).
See DAvis, ADmINISTRATIVE LAw874-914 (1951), and authorities cited.
121 Ind. App. 576, 98 N.E.2d 193 (1951).
Id. at 581, 98 N.E.2d at 195.
Id. at 586, 98 N.E.2d at 197.
Id. at 586, 98 N.E.2d at 197.
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In all probability, the Court was influenced to some extent by the
administrative determination of a question of law, because of the agency's
familiarity with the problems and relationships upon which it bore. If
so, it acted in accordance with a strong tendency in the Supreme Court
of the United States. 386 As to availability for work on the part of an

unemployment compensation claimant in this state, however, the Appellate Court has overruled the Board.38 7t In News Publishing Co. v. Verweire,3s8 the Court differed with the Board on the question whether the
claimant had been in employment subject to the act or fell within the
statutory exception of a person who, although hired by another, "has
been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance" of his work.381 The specific nature of this exception differentiates the case from N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publishing Co.,3 9 0 where the
United States Supreme Court deferred to the administrative conclusion
that news vendors who exercised considerable independence in plying
their trade were "employees" within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act.
It is generally recognized that reviewing courts are most definitely
within their own sphere, where maximum power exists to inquire into the
merits of administrative determinations, when violations of constitutional right by administrative determinations are seriously alleged. Constitutional questions have arisen most prominently in cases involving
public utility rate orders which are alleged to operate with confiscatory
effect; yet the actual scope of the judicial power in such situations remains subject to considerable uncertainty. The doctrine which formerly
prevailed that findings of fact, such as the value attributed to a utility's
property, upon which constitutional rights turn, must be open to judicial
reexamination in order to satisfy constitutional requirements, was recently declared thought to be moribund.3 91 It has nevertheless been revived in some state decisions. 892
386. See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943): "[W]hen the court
cannot separate the elements of a decision so as to identify a clear-cut mistake of law,
the decision of the Tax Court," which is to be treated like those of other administrative
agencies, "must stand."
387. Nelson v. Review Board, 119 Ind. App. 10, 82 N.E.2d 523 (1948).
388. 113 Ind. App. 451, 49 N.E.2d 161 (1943).
389. Id. at 453, 49 N.E.2d at 162.
390. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
391. DAviS, ADMINisTRATIWV LAW 919-920 (1951).
392. State ex rel. Public Service Comm'n v. Marion Circuit Court, 230 Ind. 277,
100 N.E.2d 888 (1951), dissentiitg opinion, 103 N.E.2d 214 (1952); Public Service
Comm'n v. Indianapolis Railways, 225 Ind. 30, 43, 72 N.E.2d 434, 440 (1947); Public
Service Comm'n v. Indianapolis Railways, 225 Ind. 656, 661, 665, 76 N.ER2d 841, 843,
845 (1948); Opinion of the Justices, 106 N.E.2d 259 (Mass. 1952); Staten Island
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39 3
Much abuse arose, prior to 1934 when the so-called Johnson Act

was adopted, from the federal courts' exercise of equity jurisdiction to
enjoin the enforcement of the regulatory orders of state commissions in
order to prevent alleged confiscation. That Act prohibited the exercise
of federal judicial authority under these circumstances, provided the
state order was grounded in due procedure and a "plain, speedy, and
efficient remedy" might be had in the state courts. During this period,
state courts, applying the judicial review provisions of state statutes, were
less prone to substitute their judgment for that of the state agencies, even
on constitutional questions, than the federal courts. In adopting the
former federal practice now, courts find little support in the views of
3

commentators.

94

The principal objections to the ready substitution of judicial for
administrative judgment on the issue of confiscation and to drastic
injunctions based on judicial views are that the rate-making task requires expertness to as great a degree as any with which administrative
agencies are concerned and that the essentially legislative character of
the rate-making task requires its continued freedom from the substitution
of judicial for legislative or administrative criteria. The Supreme Court
of Indiana has continued to recognize the importance of these considerations.3 9 5 Yet the process of determining whether a given rate order

operates with confiscatory effect, and of devising a remedy if it does,
tends easily to take the place of administrative control. A mere injunction against the enforcement of a commission order may seem inadequate, since it provides no guide to take the order's place. Even a court
decree enjoining a commission order and requiring that future administrative action specify rates which secure a non-confiscatory return to
the utility leaves many questions of detail unanswered until a new administrative order can be issued. To protect the utility and the public
interests involved during the interim period a reviewing court is tempted
Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947); DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw 919-920 (1951).
393. 48 STAT. 775 (1934), as reenacted, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. 1952).
394. DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 391; Barnes, Federal Courts and Rate Regulation of
Utility Rates, 43 YALE L.J. 417 (1934); Benjamin, Judicial Review of Administrative
Adjudication: Some Recent Decisions of the New York Court of Appeals, 48 COL.
L. REV. 1, 19-36 (1948) ; Lilienthal, The Federal Courts and State Regulation of Public
Utilities, 43 HAv. L. REV. 379 (1930); Segal, Administrative Procedure in Massachusetts, 33 B.U.L. REV. 1, 22-26 (1953); Note, Administrative Finality and Due

Processof Law, 36 GEo. L.J. 337 (1948).
As to the meaning of confiscation see Beutel, Valuation as a Requirement of Due
Process of Law in Rate Cases, 43 IAv. L. REV. 1249 (1930).
395. Public Service Comm'n v. Indianapolis Railways, 225 Ind. 30, 39, 72 N.E.2d
434, 438 (1947); Public Service Conm'n v. Indianapolis Railways, 225 Ind. 656, 661,
665, 76 N.E.2d 841, 843, 845 (1948).
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to accompany its injunctive relief with affirmative prescriptions. If it
does so, it must frequently receive new evidence and weigh all of the
considerations which are involved in the administrative task. Only the
most extreme urgency could justify such a course.
The judgment that confiscation is involved tends in itself to suggest
that extreme urgency is indeed present. Yet "rate-making is not an exact
science" 39 6 and there may be a vast difference between "confiscation" in
some absolute sense, involving serious financial losses, and mere inadequacy of return upon a disputable property valuation. If the latter is
all that is involved, justification for enlarged judicial review may be
lacking. Even if actual hardship to the utility results from a commission order for a period that is not too long, counterbalancing gains at
397
other times may avoid unconstitutional deprivation of property.
It seems realistic to conclude that recent decisions in this State,
approving drastic injunctions against rate orders of the Public Service
Commission,. lack adequate justification when measured by these criteria.
In each case the injunction, temporary or permanent, prevented the Commission from establishing rates lower than those specified in the injunction, upon the theory that these were the minimum rates necessary to
avoid confiscation. It is true that in the IndianapolisRailways case actual
operating losses were established to the satisfaction of the trial court.3 98
Even this factor, however, hardly justified the court in not only enjoining
confiscatory rates but also prescribing those which should take their place.
Although there is limited federal-court authority from the pre-Johnson
Act period for such a decree, 9 9 the better practice would seem to be
400
of
that adopted by the Supreme Court of Illinois in a recent case,
leaving it to the Commission to establish the rates that would satisfy the
terms of the injunction. The Indiana opinions, moreover, do not set
forth the factual justification for the trial courts' conclusions that confiscation was threatened in a sufficiently serious sense to warrant overruling the administrative findings. 401 These decisions contrast with the
396. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 196 F.2d 803 (4th Cir.
1952).

397. Ibid.
398.

Public Service Comm'n v. Indianapolis Railways, 225 Ind. 656, 76 N.E.2d

841,845 (1947).
399. See Lilienthal, supra note 394.
400. People ex rel. Sprague v. Finnegan, 393 Ill. 562, 66 N.E.2d 690 (1946)
(opinion on petition for rehearing).
401. The Indianapolis Railways case was complicated in its early stage by the
Commission's apparently unjustified refusal to proceed for 90 days with a hearing upon
a petition for an emergency fare increase. As the Court concluded, the Commission
might have been mandated to grant the hearing; hence, the outcome on the merits should
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sound relationship of judicial review to administrative action which has
been generally maintained in this State. The record as a whole should
be a source of satisfaction.
not have been affected by this factor. Public Service Comm'n v. Indianapolis Railways,

225 Ind. 30, 36, 72 N.E.2d 434, 437 (1947).

